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I believe that a continued commitment to improvement by our
Legislature, a persistent, undeviating emphasis on reform by the
executive - together with your help - can make this the begin-
ning of the most exciting reform era in this State's history.
It will take foresight, tough advocacy, intelligence and courage,
but this great State has proven over and over for 210 years that it is
capable of that kind of strength when needed. And this surely is a
moment of need ... and a moment of great opportunity.
Governor Mario M. Cuomo
Remarks to New York State Commission
on Government Integrity (the Commission)
September 9, 1987
The public is entitled to expect from its servants a set of stan-
dards far above the morals of the marketplace. Those who exercise
public and political power are trustees of the hopes and aspirations
of all mankind. They are the trustees of a system of government in
which the people must be able to place their absolute trust; for the
preservation of their welfare, their safety and all they hold dear
depends upon it.
Governor Thomas E Dewey
Public Papers 10 (1954)
Instances of corruption are commonplace in practically every seg-
ment of American society. From Wall Street to government, the fail-
ures of those who wield great power and influence and in whom we
place great trust is chronic in modem life.
The last few years have been a particularly bad time for govern-
ment integrity in New York. Since 1985, New York City has been
rocked by a series of highly publicized scandals, arguably the worst
since the days of Tammany Hall. One borough president was con-
victed of felonies; another committed suicide while under investiga-
tion; a congressman was recently convicted of bribery and extortion;
former party chairmen in two boroughs were convicted of serious
crimes; and a number of agency heads, judges, and lesser officials have
either been convicted or forced to resign under a cloud of suspicion.
And the City does not have a monopoly on malfeasance. Scandals
have also plagued the New York State Legislature and governments
elsewhere in the State.
Although certainly the vast majority of public officials are dedi-
cated and honest, these cases are representative of others in New
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York in the last few years. And probably, there are more corrupt
public officials who have not been - and may never be -- caught and
punished. Our democratic system is in crisis.
Although the scope of recent scandals is dishearteningly large,
many of our greatest institutions and reforms have come about in the
course of courageous struggles against corruption. The terrible dis-
ruption created when a public servant violates the public trust eventu-
ally awakens the citizenry and opens a possibility for change. It
arouses us from cynicism and complacency and alerts us to our com-
mon responsibility not only to halt but also to reverse ethical decline.
Consider the chaos of the 1780s which, like every other age, had
corrupt elements. The Framers of our Constitution did not throw up
their hands in despair or become cynical about government and the
political process. Instead, they gave us one of the greatest examples of
political leadership in history. They scrapped an unworkable system
for an entirely new one, viewing morality, virtue, and religion as in-
sufficient deterrents to the tendency of people who possess power to
abuse it. The Framers recognized the ineludible temptations of
power, and consequently that controls and precautions are necessary
if democratic government is to survive. The Constitution they wrote
grants power and simultaneously limits it in every possible manner.
As Madison noted in the Federalist Papers: "Ambition must be made
to counteract ambition .... It may be a reflection on human nature
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of govern-
ment. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections
on human nature?"
References to the Framers may seem distant from the challenges of
the present. They are not. The success of the Framers suggests that if
we are to convert this period into one of renewal and reform, we must
do as they did: take a hard look at ourselves and adopt substantial
changes in the way we conduct our affairs. And we must do so soon if
we want to avert widespread political apathy and public mistrust.
Obviously, as a society we must concentrate great resources on en-
forcing the law. Wrongdoers must be uncovered and punished. And
if this requires additional resources, then we must be serious about
honest government and commit whatever time and monies are neces-
sary to do the job properly.
Investigations and prosecutions are not enough, however, to meet
the challenges we face. Honest government officials labor under bur-
dens unparalleled by those imposed upon the rest of us. When those
burdens become too great, and there is no clear moral support from
the community, they can easily fall prey to the pressures they con-
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front. Private citizens have an obligation to make their ethical expec-
tations clear by communicating with their representatives, voting and
participating in political party activities. Most important, we need
sweeping reforms of our laws to safeguard the public sector from the
pressures brought to bear by private sector special interests and to
reduce the temptation of officials to abuse their trust.
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE
The idea is to prevent.., the great aggregations of wealth from
using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members
of the Legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection
and the advancement of their interests as against those of the pub-
lic. It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has done more to
shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this
country in our political institutions than any other practice which
has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.'
Elihu Root (1894)
In a democracy, holding elective office is one of the highest forms of
public service. We entrust to our officeholders not only the business
of government, but the ultimate protection of our liberty and commu-
nity. And as a result, impropriety in the way candidates campaign
strikes at the heart of our democratic system.
To compete successfully, candidates must have public relations ad-
visors and media consultants and, for the highest offices, they must
raise and spend millions of dollars. Although we complain about the
expense of elections and the superficiality of campaigns based on 30-
second television spots, for many these expensive advertisements pro-
vide the only information on which to base their votes. The result is
contradictory demands on candidates. We expect them to wage effec-
tive campaigns for public office, yet we are suspicious when they raise
the money they need to do it. There is only one way out of this di-
lemma, and that is campaign finance reform.
Campaign finance laws in New York are a disgrace. They impose
minimal limitations and are not vigorously enforced, resulting in not
only corruption and the appearance of impropriety, but voter skepti-
cism about the electoral process itself.
Good campaign finance regulations must satisfy a number of objec-
tives: limiting the undue influence of wealthy special interests, insur-
ing that the public is informed about the sources and amounts of a
candidate's support, providing for adequate enforcement, encouraging
democratic competition for office and promoting confidence in gov-
ernment. New York's regulations fail these tests miserably.
1. Elihu Root served as U.S. Senator from New York, U.S. Secretary of War, U.S.
Secretary of State, and won the 1912 Nobel Peace Prize. The passage is from a speech he
gave urging a constitutional convention in New York to pass campaign finance reform.
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Contribution limits
Currently, the ceiling on contributions for political purposes by in-
dividuals is so high it can hardly be termed a limit: $150,000 per year.
Large contributors dominate New York political campaigns. For ex-
ample, among the three New York Citywide officeholders - Mayor
Edward Koch, Comptroller Harrison Goldin, and City Council Presi-
dent Andrew Stein - no more than 4% of their total contributions in
the last five years came from gifts. of less than 100 dollars. More than
80% of the total in each case came from gifts of $1,000 and above,
and between 43% and 65% came from gifts of $5,000 or more.
The contribution pattern of the four statewide officeholders -
Governor Mario Cuomo, Lieutenant Governor Stan Lundine, Comp-
troller Edward Regan and Attorney General Robert Abrams - is
similar. No more than 5% of their totals in the last five years came
from gifts of less than $100, roughly 80% from gifts over $1,000 and
between 24% and 55% from gifts of $5,000 and more. And less than
0.3% of the voters in New York State even make political contribu-
tions, further strengthening the power of the wealthy elite that give
huge amounts. The current law's outrageously high limits render the
gift of the average person insignificant, while insuring that the gifts of
the wealthy remain the cornerstone of every campaign.
Our study of legislative campaign funding practices reveals a simi-
larly disturbing pattern. Corporations, unions and their political ac-
tion committees (PACs) accounted for roughly 60% of the $11
million raised during a five-year period by the Democratic and Re-
publican Senate and Assembly legislative committees. PAC contribu-
tions to these committees are virtually unlimited by the law.
Contributions as high as $10,000 and $20,000 from PACs are com-
monplace, with single donations swelling to a staggering $100,000.
Top legislative leaders control the committees' coffers, funneling large
sums to hotly contested races and transferring lesser amounts to the
campaigns of incumbents seeking reelection to "safe" seats. This cre-
ates a climate of indebtedness, with some candidates owing their suc-
cess to party leaders who are in turn dangerously dependent on
special interests.
Corporate contributions are similarly unrestrained. Technically, of
course, they are limited ($5,000 per year) but there is a huge loophole:
the gifts of subsidiary and affiliated corporations are not included in
the parent company's total. A real estate developer testified to the
Commission that in a single month he used 21 subsidiary corporations
as vehicles for giving $100,000 to City Comptroller Harrison Goldin.
"My friend needed help, so I helped him," he said. The federal gov-
BLUEPRINT
ernment has banned corporate contributions since 1907; 19 other
states have followed. It is long past time that New York did the same.
More pernicious still, the current law allows those doing business
with the government to contribute directly to the very people deciding
who gets the government's business. As an example, more than 90%
of State Comptroller Regan's campaign contributions between Janu-
ary, 1983 and January, 1988 came from the financial, legal and real
estate communities; three groups that benefit directly from his office's
decisions as sole manager of the state's $38 billion pension fund. On
August 29, 1985, another real estate developer gave $30,000 to City
Council President Andrew Stein through 17 corporations he con-
trolled. Such contributors' profits are directly affected by discretion-
ary actions by Stein and the other members of the Board of Estimate,
who in turn rely on such large contributions to get elected.
The testimony received at our public hearing from various business
leaders suggests that it would be naive to think that these gifts are
always a pure expression of democratic support. One witness said he
contributed "more to avoid a negative impact, than trying to incur a
positive result." Commission staff members were told by some busi-
ness people that "it would be bad business judgment to stop contribut-
ing to campaigns." Some of those testifying had no idea how much
they had given; others, playing it safe, gave to different candidates
vying for the same office and, not surprisingly, saw no necessity to
vote in the election in which they had contributed. What is clear is
that many business people see their contributions as a cost of doing
business, a payment for benefits they might not otherwise receive.
It is not the Commission's function to prove a direct link between a
big contribution and a lucrative contract. That is a job for prosecu-
tors. Yet it is undeniable that large contributions by those doing busi-
ness with government provide access that average citizens do not
enjoy, and create an appearance of impropriety that damages the vot-
ers' confidence that our democratic process is fair..2
Disclosure
Democracy depends on a well-informed electorate. As Justice
2. The Commission proposes limiting individual contributions to the following
ranges: governor, lieutenant governor, and comptroller of the State of New York: $2,500
to $4,000; state legislators: $1,500 to $2,000; mayor, City Council president, and comp-
troller of New York City: $2,500 to $4,000; all other city and county offices: $1,000 to
$2,000; town, village and other local offices: $500 to $1,000. The Commission also rec-
ommends that PAC contributions be limited to similar ranges in their contributions to
candidates, and to $5,000 in their contributions to state, legislative and local party
committees.
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Brandeis stated, "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for so-
cial and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants; electric light the most efficient policeman." ' Unfortunately, the
current disclosure requirements involving contributors are so inade-
quate they seem designed to hide a candidate's sources of support.
The Commission's investigation has uncovered several examples.
Candidates do not have to reveal their contributors' employers, al-
lowing the executives of a single company to make large individual
contributions that add up to what is in effect a huge secret corporate
contribution. Insuring that a candidate is aware of the extent of a
company's support is easy: the executives' checks simply are deliv-
ered in a single bundle, and the public is none the wiser. Political
advertisements do not have to state their sponsors, keeping the public
in the dark about who is behind the slick and persuasive political
messages that bombard them before many elections.4
The State Board of Elections, which is supposed to correct these
problems, instead compounds them. It does not even insist that the
current disclosure forms - which are inadequate to begin with - be
typed, resulting often in completely illegible and useless filings. It has
also failed to computerize and publicize the vital data it does receive.
Without computerization and enhanced disclosure requirements, the
public cannot know who has paid the fare to bring their leaders to
office.5
Public funding
In the 1986 election cycle, the winners of the four state-wide races
together spent more than $20 million on their campaigns. In the 1985
election cycle, New York City Mayor Edward Koch, Council Presi-
dent Andrew Stein, and Comptroller Harrison Goldin, spent a total of
more than $10 million to win their races. When running for public
office requires enormous expenditures of privately raised funds, chal-
3. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (National Home Library Foundation
ed. 1933).
4. Contrast this with the law governing federal elections that requires that all polit-
ical advertisements that "expressly advocat[e] the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate," or ask for contributions, clearly state their sponsors and whether the adver-
tisement has been authorized by the candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1980).
5. In an effort to investigate the campaign finance issue thoroughly, the Commission
undertook a massive project to computerize the records of the Board of Election. That
effort is well under way, and as a result, for the first time, it is possible for the public and
the press to determine the amount of campaign support public officials have received
from specific individuals and corporations. Printouts of the data base may be borrowed
for copying from the Commission's offices, and the entire data base is available on com-
puter diskette free of charge.
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lenges to incumbents are all but limited to the most wealthy and well-
connected. Moreover, huge campaign costs pressure candidates to
maintain political views that do not offend big money interests.
To address these problems, several states - and the federal govern-
ment for presidential campaigns - have adopted public funding.
And on November 8, 1988, New York City's voters approved public
funding for city-wide races by an overwhelming 79% margin.
If properly formulated, public funding can have several salutary ef-
fects on the political process. First, it provides a constitutional way to
limit campaign expenditures. Second, public funding encourages
more vigorous competition by insuring that challengers have sufficient
resources to get their message across to the electorate. Third, it helps
keep the focus of campaigns on political issues rather than on fund-
raising.
Finally, public financing lessens the influence of particularly gener-
ous individual donors. Public funding gives candidates a source of
income that will not demand access or favors at some later date. It
gives elected officials an independence from vested community inter-
ests and as a result, the freedom to challenge those interests for the
public good. And, if properly designed, public funding strengthens
the relationship between candidates and the public they represent,
and will allay the cynical belief that current campaign fund-raising
practices are a form of "legalized bribery."6
Enforcement
Since its creation in 1974, the State Board of Elections has been an
ineffectual watchdog. It has done little more than collect candidates'
campaign contribution and expenditure filings, let them sit undis-
turbed for five years, and then destroy them. The State Board does
not computerize, analyze or disclose the important information it re-
ceives in any meaningful way. Without computerization and analysis,
the Board cannot enforce the basic features of the Election Law.
New York's Board of Elections lags behind other states. The Assis-
6. The Commission supports public funding for state-wide offices, and believes other
municipalities should be permitted to institute such programs if they wish. However,
after careful study, the Commission has declined at this time to recommend public fund-
ing for legislative races. The Commission feels that the vast majority of legislative candi-
dates do not currently spend excessive amounts on their general election campaigns and,
accordingly, that these elections do not present the various evils attendant to excessively
costly campaigns. The Commission also believes that the effect of the other reforms we
have proposed should be studied carefully before public funds are committed to legisla-
tive races.
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tant Staff Director of the United States Federal Election Commission
testified before the Commission:
If you want to be a leader.., you have got to be out front, you
have got to be thinking of new ideas, you have to have a budget,
you have to have the staff to do it, you have to have the support of
the Legislature to do it. I don't think that New York has done
very much at all. I would probably put New York where New
Jersey was about fifteen years ago....
New York has a long, long way to go. I don't think it is any-
where near being a leader. You are not even in consideration in
that regard.
The testimony of a former Board of Elections investigator gives a
clue about why we have fallen short:
It seemed like the [State Board of Elections] Commissioners
didn't want anything new happening, or anything innovative hap-
pening within the Board. They just wanted to keep things nice and
quiet and not distribute that type of information that could lead to
questions, and potential problems....
Commissioners of the Board of Elections are appointed under a sys-
tem that all but guarantees complacency by the Board toward its cam-
paign financing responsibilities. The budget as well as the
appointments to the Board are controlled by the most powerful peo-
ple the Board is supposed to police. Under the current practice, the
Governor must appoint one of the people recommended by the
chairperson of the State Democratic Committee, one of the people
recommended by the chairperson of the State Republican Committee,
the person jointly recommended by the Democratic Party's two legis-
lative leaders and the person jointly recommended by the Republican
Party's two legislative leaders.7
The resulting potential for conflict of interest is obvious even to the
Board's Executive Director, who testified before the Commission that:
I think another thing we have to recognize is that in effect, the
Legislature is our clientele. We are asking them for more auditors,
more investigators, so that we can do a better job reviewing the
reports of legislators, and so forth. I think there is a reluctance
there.
The solution is clear: a new, independent agency must be formed
with sole responsibility for enforcing the campaign finance laws. This
7. The potential effects of the Board's ties to the political establishment are further
exacerbated by the fact that Commissioners serve two-year terms, making it easy to re-
place them quickly if the Board's actions are unpopular.
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new agency should be charged only with campaign financing responsi-
bilities. Ballot administration and voter registration should be the re-
sponsibility of a separate body. Campaign financing experts consulted
by the Commission were unanimous in their view that these areas
should be separated. As the former chairman of both the New Jersey
and federal campaign financing agencies testified,
My feeling and conclusion is that it would be best to have a sin-
gle agency charged with campaign finance disclosure responsibil-
ity, simply because of the nature of the work involved.
Contrast it, if you will, with what the State Board of Elections
does. They do extremely important work but of an entirely differ-
ent sort. They are involved in insuring that everything goes well
on Election Day, that we all vote, and if that ever becomes tar-
nished, we are all in trouble and we know it.
But what you're talking about in terms of campaign financing is
very sophisticated investigation, and I think that's best left to one
specific agency, if we are talking about the financing of elections.
If both responsibilities are given to a single agency, that agency will
inevitably devote more of its resources and attention to issues it must
resolve - such as which candidates are to appear on the ballot -
than to issues such as post-election review of the adequacy of a candi-
date's financial disclosure statements.
The Commissioners of this new campaign finance enforcement
agency should be appointed by the Governor from choices provided
by an independent nominating commission. Such a nominating com-
mission, patterned after the successful independent commission which
nominates judges for the Court of Appeals, should include members
of civic groups, business and religious leaders, as well as people more
directly involved in politics. The new agency must be adequately
funded, and its budget must be insulated from reprisal by public
officials.
We must guarantee that the taxpayers' money for campaign financ-
ing will be spent carefully, that contribution limits will mean some-
thing, and that they will have easy access to matters of public record.
But without an effective, independent enforcement agency these re-
forms will be as meaningless as criminal laws without police.
New Yorkers are well aware of the problems with our current cam-
paign finance system. According to a poll conducted for the Commis-
sion, 77% of voters support campaign finance reform, 78% believe
that individuals have far too little influence over state government,
and approximately 60% think that corporations, labor unions and
political parties give in order to "influence or control" a candidate.
1990-91]
184 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
We find these statistics shocking. When 60% of the registered vot-
ers in our state believe that corporate, union and party contributions
are a form of legal bribery rather than an expression of support, our
system is in a state of crisis. The extent of voter cynicism in New
York is alarming. Our leaders must take the steps necessary to re-
store public confidence. The Commission has not worked on any is-
sue more important than campaign finance reform.
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JUDICIAL SELECTION
I'm against elected judges because the way you get elected judges
is the way they do it in the Bronx. You get. three political leaders
together, boom, they pick a guy and he's the judge, he's elected.
Governor Mario Cuomo (1988)
It is very difficult to take people who are successful in practice
and say to them, become a judge in our State system, work well,
work diligently, and then if everything is all right you can go back
to the political leader and perhaps seek renomination to run again.
New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler
It is hard indeed to face, in middle or later age and with your
practice and clients gone, the prospect of being turned out of office
because you have made an honest but unpopular decision. Indeed,
I am continually gratified and amazed at the frequency with which
my colleagues on the state bench do just .that; but it is a test to
which they should not be put, over and over and day by day.
Thomas Gibbs Gee, Circuit Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals, Houston
Unlike the other branches of government which are primarily con-
cerned with the wishes of majorities, the judicial branch is charged
with protecting the basic rights of individuals. In doing so, the judici-
ary necessarily must focus on the facts of particular cases, blocking
out personal or political prejudice, bias, and self-interest. At their
best, our courts serve as an institutional refuge for the oppressed, the
powerless and the mistreated; a place-where any citizen can turn for a
just and fair hearing.
Even the appearance of partiality in the judiciary is dangerous.
Without public confidence in the independence of our judges, the
moral foundation of the rule of law is threatened. As Chief Judge
Wachtler stated, "the whole justice system is balanced very delicately
on what we call the public trust."
Most judges in New York are chosen by elections that are almost
totally controlled by political party leaders, a system which clashes
with the ideal of an independent and nonpartisan judiciary. By pro-
moting political favoritism and rewarding party loyalty, judicial elec-
tions enhance political leaders' undue influence over judges,
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discourage lawyers without political connections from seeking judge-
ships, and threaten public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
system. Partly for these reasons the Framers of the Federal Constitu-
tion mandated an appointive system for Federal judges and Justices of
the United States Supreme Court, and the voters of New York State
chose this method for their highest court.
In virtually every county in New York, a few political party leaders
effectively control judgeships by making the crucial decisions: who
will be designated or nominated, and who will receive the support of
the party organization critical to election. As one political leader tes-
tified before the Commission,
I don't recall a judicial convention in twenty years that the can-
didates recommended by the County Leader were not designated.
There were conventions where other names were put in but they
never were successful in getting enough votes to be the designees of
the Convention ....
I'm talking about Queens, because I reside there. I know for a
fact this is true in Manhattan and other counties in the City and
the State, where the Judicial Convention really operated as a rub-
ber stamp of the County Leader and it has done so for many years,
probably continues to do so.
The overriding concern of these party leaders is quite naturally
political: advancing the party organization, cementing party loyalty,
and consolidating their power. But what is natural for political lead-
ers is not necessarily healthy for the judiciary. Choosing judges based
on party service demeans the bench by drastically narrowing the pool
of potential judges, by introducing a standard other than judicial ex-
cellence, and by creating criteria for reelection which are at best irrel-
evant and at worst dangerous. The testimony of another political
leader about the selection process is particularly revealing:
Well it's based on friendships, relationships built up over the
years. For example, there's a young man that goes to my church
who has been - I've known him since he was a Little Leaguer, so
now he's a lawyer, and he also belongs to my political club, and I
sort of look to the day when I will be able to nominate him for a
judgeship, you know.
So that's a particular personal relationship. If you run out of
friends, then you look to see other considerations. You don't
hardly run out of friends before somebody else comes up with a
friend, and rather than take another opportunity, you may have to
step aside and let somebody else put forth their candidate.
Obviously, the only requirements that I know of for being a
judge, and I may be wrong, is having been admitted [to the bar] for
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ten years, and I don't even know of any other objective test besides
that. . . . So if you have been admitted to practice and you are
without experiences of a negative nature, I assume that on the face
of it, that qualifies you to become a judge.
New York can and must do better. Our State and its citizens de-
serve to have the finest people that will serve. We expect much from
our judges: independence, courage, honesty, ability, knowledge, un-
derstanding and compassion. Political connections should not be the
overriding consideration in their selection.
Obviously, the fact that judges owe their positions to party leaders,
and depend on them for renomination when their terms expire, di-
rectly threatens judicial independence. When asked if he would feel
pressure in deciding a case where one of the lawyers was a political
leader who could affect his judicial career, one judge testified,
Yes I'm human. I'll think about it, and I shouldn't have to
think about it. I shouldn't have to have my energies dissipated in
wondering what the reaction is going to be or how I'm going to kill
myself for the next election ... but that's the system. It should be
changed.
The appeal of elections is clear. Allowing the voters to choose who
will judge them sounds like the fulfillment of a democratic ideal.
However, the rosy picture of the informed voter carefully choosing
the candidate he or she believes can best be fair, impartial and judi-
cious has nothing to do with the election of judges in New York.
Currently, judgeships in the Supreme, Surrogate's, County, City,
District, Civil, and Family Courts outside of New York City are elec-
tive positions, more than 800 in total. Yet, very few people even know
the name of any of the judges in their districts, much less the names or
backgrounds of the range of candidates.
Judicial races simply do not attract voter interest. Judges must
make decisions based strictly on the specific facts of an individual
case, and it is therefore obviously improper for them to make cam-
paign promises about how they would rule on particular issuesY For
them to do so would institutionalize bias and debase the ideal of non-
partisanship. Widespread public cynicism would be the certain out-
come. As a result, judicial elections are intrinsically "issueless," and
it is hopelessly unrealistic to imagine they will ever attract the interest
of very many voters.
8. This potential impropriety is recognized by the American and New York Bar
Associations. Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits candidates from expres-
sing their views on "disputed legal or political issues." See N.Y. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7 (McKinney 1975).
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Moreover, even if genuinely democratic, an elective system would
still threaten judicial independence. Public officials are concerned
with the majority's will. The dispensing of justice turns on very differ-
ent factors; that is why we do not have trial and punishment by popu-
lar opinion.
Politics cannot be banished altogether from judicial selection,
whether under an elective or appointive system. If properly designed,
however, an appointive system will foster judicial independence and
guarantee that qualified candidates without political connections have
a fair chance to become judges.
Nominating commissions should be created to send only a limited
number of the very best candidates to an executive - such as a Gov-
ernor or Mayor - who would then make the appointments. By limit-
ing the executive's latitude, we limit the possible influence of politics
on the choice. To insure that the commissions remain independent,
they should be composed of a broad range of individuals of various
professions and political backgrounds, and should be officially
charged with making their selections purely on the basis of judicial
merit.
A properly designed appointive system will take power out of the
hands of unaccountable party bosses and give it to elected public offi-
cials accountable to the voters for their decisions. Appointive systems
have been endorsed by every major civic group that has studied the
issue, including the Citizens Union, Common Cause, the League of
Women Voters, the Fund for Modern Courts, and the New York City
and New York State Bar Associations. Nationally, 34 states use ap-
pointment to select at least some of their judges, and since 1950, every
state that has made a change has moved toward appointment.
We must stop -perpetuating the myth that judicial elections have
anything to do with democratic choice. They do not and they cannot.
The right kind of appointive system will hold judicial ability - not
political party service - paramount, and will give New Yorkers the
finest judiciary possible.
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THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT
Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair.
George Washington
Morality can't be legislated, but behavior can be regulated.
The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
But the great pity about virtue being its own reward is that the
reward always seems so small. It's the appearance, not the fact, of
conflict that is so often troubling. Appearances do count. And
most especially when it affects public officials. The appearance of
conflict counts almost as much as reality. A great gray area exists
called unseemliness. It ain't illegal. But it just ain't right.
William Safire
Government both influences and reflects the ethical tenor of our
society. As bearers of the public trust, our officials must be held to
the highest standards of behavior. When they falter, they not only
betray their responsibilities to the citizens of our :State, but they en-
courage us to do the same to each other. As Justice Brandeis wrote,
"[o]ur government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." 9 Ethics-in-gov-
ernment legislation is, therefore, doubly important. Not only does it
deter abuse, it articulates a moral standard for the entire community.
New York's current Ethics Law falls short in many areas. When
the State Legislature passed the Ethics [in Government] Act in
1987,10 regulating the actions of executive and legislative branch offi-
cials and employees,.it was called an historic advance. Without ques-
tion it was an important step and represents a real improvement over
the laws that existed at the time. But the Act still has huge loopholes,
and some of its enforcement provisions actually tie prosecutors'
hands.
The Act paralyzes district attorneys by barring them from prose-
cuting violations without an official referral from one of the oversight
commissions the Act created. Unlike every other situation in which a
crime is committed, a district attorney with evidence that a govern-
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
10. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 811 (McKinney 1987).
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ment official has broken the law cannot do anything if the oversight
commission has not officially transferred the case.
This referral requirement sends the wrong message to New
Yorkers. It teaches that while private citizens are subject to the in-
quiries of an independent prosecutor, those who hold government of-
fice are not. It suggests that public officials have something to hide,
and intend to hide it. The referral requirement is clearly a double
standard, and it is probably unconstitutional as well."1
In fact, the oversight commission may have good reason for not
referring the case: the Act forbids the commission from imposing
civil fines once it has referred a case to a prosecutor, even if the crimi-
nal prosecution is unsuccessful. Faced with the choice of an inade-
quate but assured civil penalty, and the possibility of no penalty at all,
the oversight commission may hesitate to refer even the most egre-
gious examples of official misconduct.
The Act's preferential treatment of public officials goes beyond in-
hibiting investigation. Under some interpretations, the law gives an
official who intentionally files false disclosure information 15 days af-
ter he or she is caught to revise their filings secretly and without pen-
alty, an opportunity not afforded any other person accused of
breaking a law. Our public leaders must be held to the highest possi-
ble ethical standards. Yet the Ethics Act gives them a legal loophole
unavailable to the average citizen. As District Attorney Morgenthau
wrote, "No other law permits a violator such an opportunity to undo
his crime with full confidentiality. The result is that serious miscon-
duct will go unpunished."12
The Act also permits state officials to represent private clients
before all municipal agencies for any purpose, and before state agen-
cies in a number of crucial areas including certain tax and criminal
matters. This creates obvious problems. Because budget appropria-
tions and other decisions made in Albany affect municipalities and
state agencies, local and state officials may be subjected to excessive
pressure, even if not intended. Government officials' appearances
11. The New York Constitution provides:
The power of the grand juries to inquire into the wilful misconduct in office of
public officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of information in
connection with such inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See also Letter from Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney,
Kings County, to Governor Mario M. Cuomo (July 24, 1987); Memorandum from Rob-
ert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, to Governor Mario M. Cuomo at 6 (July 7,
1987). Both are contained in the Governor's Bill Jacket for S.6441.
12. Letter from Robert M. Morgenthau, New York County District Attorney, to
Governor Mario M. Cuomo (July 15, 1987) (written on behalf of the District Attorneys
Association of New York).
BLUEPRINT
before those agencies are inevitably intimidating, and may taint the
eventual decision in the public eye. They should be forbidden.
There is one area where the Act goes too far, and in fact overbur-
dens public officials. The Act mandates absurdly excessive financial
disclosure requirements for all government employees making more
than $30,000 per year (roughly 70,000 in all, not counting employees
of Public Authorities), unless they appear before the appropriate com-
mission and demonstrate that their job duties do not necessitate dis-
closure. The disclosure form the Act requires is seven pages long and
correspondingly detailed. In other words, the enforcement commis-
sions throughout the State will be burdened with more than 490,000
pages of financial disclosure information, a mountain of paper that
will effectively block enforcement of the law when it matters, and im-
pose an onerous burden on tens of thousands of employees covered
for no good reason.
It is difficult enough to attract talented people into government ser-
vice. Many more will be discouraged if they are required to reveal
publicly the particulars of their personal finances. Certainly, broad
financial disclosure is important for people in policy-making posi-
tions. But those positions should be defined by the responsibilities
that accompany them, not by salary level.
13
Although most public officials are dedicated and honest, the faith of
many people in the government has been weakened. Our system de-
pends on public confidence in the basic integrity of the government
and its elected officials. In a democracy, distrust can be as damaging
as corruption itself. A reformed Ethics Act would not only deter
wrongdoing, it would also be the best demonstration that the political
leadership of New York is committed to fundamental change.
13. Commissioners James L. Magavern and Richard D. Emery support a different
approach to disclosure, which they believe would prove both less intrusive upon the per-
sonal lives of state employees and more effective in protecting the public interest. Instead
of annual, uniform disclosure for all covered employees, regardless of relevance to their
particular jobs, the Act should require disclosure on a transactional basis. Before taking
action in a particular matter in which the employee (or a party related to the employee by
family or business) has an interest, the employee should be required to file a transactional
disclosure statement identifying that interest and relationship in reasonable detail.
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BALLOT ACCESS
The problem of ballot access has eliminated or completely crippled
many candidacies, for many years. They have been almost exclu-
sively insurgent candidacies in less well-publicized races, and many
had legitimate popular support for a place on the ballot .... The
ballot access problem has - for too many years - impeded or
eliminated valid candidacies, deprived voters of a choice, and dam-
aged our political system.14
Vance Benguiat, Executive Director,
Citizens Union of the City of New York
The heart of our democratic ideal is the right of the people to
choose whom they want to represent and lead them. This maxim has
guided our country and state for more than 200 years. Our commit-
ment to it has been tested in struggles over voting rights, the infamous
"Jim Crow" laws, and redistricting. Today in our state, the test of
our commitment comes in a less dramatic, but no less important,
form. New York's ballot access laws are supposed to protect the
political process from frivolous candidates, and insure that qualified
voters decide who gets on the ballot. In reality, they throw serious
candidates off the ballot for frivolous reasons, and frustrate demo-
cratic choice through meaningless litigation.
Unlike most other states, getting on the primary ballot in New
York requires a candidate to collect a substantial number of signa-
tures of party members on a nominating petition. 5 And unlike other
states, the rules governing the validity of the petitions are unbeliev-
ably complex and rigid.
Technical defects can nullify entire petitions. A petition may be
thrown out simply because the person carrying it for the candidate is
registered to vote in a district other than the one in which the signa-
tures must be obtained, or because the pages of the petition are not
consecutively numbered. In Erie County in 1984, for example, a can-
didate for county committeeman was denied a place on the ballot be-
cause his two-page designating petition was not consecutively
numbered. 16
Similarly, if the person actually carrying the petition fails to date it,
14. Statement to Joint Public Hearing of the State Senate and Assembly Election Law
Committees on Ballot Access (October 15, 1985).
15. Most states permit a candidate to get on the primary ballot by paying a filing fee
or, alternatively, through a simpler petition process.
16. Braxton v. Mahoney, 63 N.Y.2d 691, 468 N.E.2d 1111, 479 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1984).
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or misstates or omits various information, such as his or her address
or assembly and election districts, the entire petition is invalid. For
example, in 1979 in Erie County, a candidate for town councilman
filed a petition with almost twice as many signatures as the law re-
quired. Unfortunately for the candidate and his many supporters, the
people that carried the petition failed to list their assembly districts.
Because of this the candidate was dropped from the ballot, even
though listing the assembly district was listing the obvious: the town
had only one assembly district and all the people carrying the petition
lived in the town. 17
A petition may also be thrown out if its pages are not correctly
bound together. In Albany County, a candidate for county legislator
was denied a place on the ballot in part because his petitions were
held together with a spring clip, and the court upheld the ruling of the
Albany County Board of Elections that the spring clip did not consti-
tute a binding.'" Likewise, if a petition is not filed during the precise
period of time specified by the law, the candidate may be barred from
the ballot. In one instance in 1987, candidates for local office filed
their designating petitions at 8:30 a.m., shortly after the Village Clerk
arrived at work, rather than between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m., as the law instructs. The candidates were thrown off the
ballot. 19
These examples are not isolated instances. Last year, New York
accounted for one half of all the election law litigation in the coun-
try.20 In 1986 alone, 200 New York candidates in primary elections
were denied places on the ballot because of technical errors on their
petitions, even though they had significant public support and had
substantially complied with the Election Law's procedural require-
ments. These technicalities effectively disenfranchise tens of
thousands of voters every year.
Worse still, the ballot access laws overwhelmingly favor incum-
bents and candidates with the support of the party organization.
These candidates have access to large numbers of highly experienced
party volunteers who can get two or three times the number of signa-
tures necessary to survive challenges to their petitions, and are able
through the party organization to hire experts and lawyers to review
17. Higby v. Mahoney, 48 N.Y.2d 15, 396 N.E.2d 183, 421 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1979).
18. Bouldin v. Scaringe, 133 A.D.2d 287, 519 N.Y.S.2d 72 (3d Dep't 1987).
19. Rutherford v. Jones, 128 A.D.2d 978, 512 N.Y.S.2d 934 (3d Dep't 1987).
20. See, e.g., New York Newsday, May 17, 1988, at 20 (quoting Angelo T. Cometa,
chairman of the New York State Bar Association's Special Committee on Election Law).
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their opponents' petitions and to engage in the protracted ballot litiga-
tion chronic to New York elections.
The State Legislature and Governor should appoint a blue-ribbon,
multipartisan panel to recommend fundamental reformation of the
law. And in the interim, the Legislature should pass a bill providing
that candidates will not be penalized for insubstantial deviations from
the requirements of the current law. As with campaign finance re-
form, the incumbents who benefit from the ballot access laws are the
same officials who hold the power to reform them. The public must
make it clear to their representatives that they want these laws
changed.
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PENSION FORFEITURE
Government is more than the sum of all the interests; it is the para-
mount interest, the public interest. It must be the efficient, effec-
tive agent of a responsible citizenry, not the shelter of the
incompetent and corrupt.
Adlai Stevenson
No one believes that crime should pay. Unfortunately, in New
York, public officials who betray the public trust and are convicted of
crimes relating to their position still receive huge sums of the taxpay-
ers' money in the form of pension benefits.
The case of convicted former Syracuse Mayor Lee Alexander dra-
matically illustrates the problem. Alexander pleaded guilty in Janu-
ary, 1988 to federal charges that he turned the Mayor's office into a
racketeering enterprise and extorted at least $1.2 million from con-
tractors doing business with the City during his 16 years as Mayor.
He was sentenced in March, 1986 to ten years in prison. He draws an
annual state pension of $18,716.
The pensions of corrupt judges are likewise insulated. Former State
Supreme Court Justice William C. Brennan was convicted in Decem-
ber, 1985 of accepting almost $50,000 in bribes to fix four criminal
cases. Released after serving 26 months in prison, he receives $41,236
per year. The former Supreme Court Justice and Administrative
Judge of Queens County, Francis X. Smith, who was convicted of
perjury in 1987 in a Queens cable television scandal, receives $47,877
annually.
Convicted New York City employees are similarly treated. John
Cassiliano, a former superintendent of the City Sanitation Depart-
ment's Bureau of Waste Management, pleaded guilty to federal racke-
teering charges. Over an eight-year period, Cassiliano permitted
millions of gallons of hazardous chemical waste to be dumped in New
York City's solid waste landfills, collecting more than $660,000 in
bribes and payoffs in return. While New York City still struggles, at a
cost of millions of dollars, to clean up the environmental damage Cas-
siliano left behind, taxpayers are footing a second bill: in the six years
since Cassiliano retired, he has collected almost $125,000 in pension
benefits, and the checks totalling more than $20,000 keep rolling in
every year.
Cassiliano is not alone. Alex Liberman, the former Deputy Direc-
tor of the New York City Department of General Services, pleaded
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guilty in June, 1984 to a federal racketeering charge of extorting over
$1 million from building owners seeking to lease space to the City.
Liberman got 12 years in jail and a $9,951 annual City pension.
New York's retirement systems should be explicitly based on the
principle that the faithful and honest performance of a public em-
ployee's official duties is as much a precondition to eligibility for a
pension as fulfilling the existing statutory age and length of service
requirements. In the public sector, pensions are not merely a form of
deferred compensation. They are a "reward for faithfulness to duty
and honesty of performance. '21 Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, Illi-
nois and Massachusetts have all enacted pension forfeiture statutes
which recognize that loyal, honest public service is a prerequisite to
pension eligibility. New York must do the same, although we should
leave room for a portion of the convict's public pension to be paid to
his or her spouse, children or other beneficiaries upon demonstration
to a judge of severe financial hardship. It is time we put an end to the
unjustifiable practice of pensioning corrupt public officials at public
expense.
21. Pell v. Board of Education, 34 N.Y 2d 222, 238, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 845 (1974).
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OPEN MEETINGS LAW
Secrecy and a free, democratic government don't mix.
Harry S. Truman
Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among
the people, who have a right... and a desire to know; but besides
this, they have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible,
divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I
mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers.
John Adams
A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765)
It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the
public business be performed in an open and public manner and
that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe
the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the de-
liberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.
The people must be able to remain informed if they are to retain
public control over those who are their public servants. It is the
only climate under which the commonwealth will prosper and en-
able the governmental process to operate for the benefit of those
who created it.
Legislative Declaration, New York State
Open Meetings Law (1976)
Back room decisions about the public's business breed self-dealing
and disregard of the public's interest. Democracy demands public
participation in public issues, and when that participation is under-
mined, apathy, cynicism and an erosion of confidence in the integrity
of government are the sure results.
New York's Open Meetings Law, as first enacted in 1976, recog-
nized that openness and honesty in government are fundamentally
linked. Summarized simply, it required that "every meeting of a pub-
lic body shall be open to the general public,"' 22 that these meetings
should be announced in advance, and the minutes should be available
to anyone who wants to see them.
Obviously, exceptions to this rule are necessary. The law properly
22. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 103(a) (McKinney 1988).
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exempts discussions about collective bargaining negotiations, litiga-
tion, and most judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. These exemp-
tions reflect a balance between the principle that the public's business
must be conducted in a public manner, and the recognition that cer-
tain deliberations must be free from the pressures that accompany
publicity.
Unfortunately, this balance is upset by another recent exemption,
so broad it can be exploited to effectively gut the law. In 1985, the
State Legislature passed an amendment to the law allowing private
political caucuses,
without regard to (i) the subject matter under discussion, including
discussion of public business, (ii) the majority or minority status of
such political committees, conferences and caucuses, or (iii)
whether such political committees, conferences and caucuses invite
staff or guests to participate in their deliberations. *23
Many communities in our state are dominated by one political party.
The 1985 amendment means that in these areas, a majority of the
legislative body can meet privately as a political party caucus and ef-
fectively reach binding decisions on public business. Worse, they can
systematically exclude democratically elected representatives from the
minority party from any role in the decision-making process.
For example, the sole Republican member of the Rochester City
Council testified in hearings before the Commission that the Demo-
cratic majority regularly met in closed caucus and received "agenda
briefings" by staff and others on various matters, including an indus-
trial expansion in that Republican member's district; a review of the
proposed line item school budget by the superintendent of schools and
school board; and a statement by a utility representative on the util-
ity's stand on a proposed reassessment program. As the council mem-
ber stated, "[m]y exclusion prevents me from representing my
constituents adequately because city policy questions are decided at
closed meetings outside my presence."
The enforcement provisions of the law are feeble. The law allows
less-than-quorum meetings to be held secretly, even if the participants
in the meeting systematically rotate people in and out for the express
purpose of insuring that there is never a quorum present. Such behav-
23. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108(2)(b) (McKinney 1988). The amendment was intro-
duced just six weeks after reporters from the New York Post obtained an advisory opin-
ion from the Committee on Open Government that caucuses held by a majority of the
members of either house of the New York State Legislature for the purpose of conducting
public business are subject to the law. The amendment was passed by both houses a week
later, and Governor Cuomo signed it within 24 hours.
1990-91] BLUEPRINT 199
ior should be expressly prohibited. In addition, after secret delibera-
tions, if the final vote is taken in public, the courts do not have the
power to void the decision. Obviously, this law must be given teeth,
including fines against public officials who intentionally flout the law's
provisions.
Open meetings, like democracy itself, are not always pleasant or
convenient. As one witness testified,
Yes, it is uncomfortable to vote yourself a pay raise in public. Yes,
it is uncomfortable to talk about a school with asbestos in it in
front of anxious parents. Yes, it is uncomfortable to talk about
where to locate low income housing when you have people in the
audience who might live next to the site, but, whoever said democ-
racy had to be easy or comfortable?
Every time a citizen sees a closed meeting as a blind for misconduct,
democracy suffers. We all wonder for good reason what officials have
to hide when they wrap themselves in a cloak of secrecy.
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PATRONAGE
By definition, I think that [patronage], leads people to believe
government is corrupt, that it is not serving the public interest gen-
erally, that it is serving the interests of one party or one set of
people, rather than the community as a whole.
Professor David Rosenbloom24
Testimony to the
New York State Commission on Government Integrity
(January 9, 1989)
To surrender dreams is madness, but maddest of all is to see the
world as it is and not as it should be.
Miguel de Cervantes
(January 1605)
Patronage has been a part of municipal government for a long time,
in New York and elsewhere throughout the country. Although its
heyday - as exemplified in New York City's Tammany Hall organi-
zation or Chicago's Democratic machine - may be over, patronage is
still used to purchase favors, reward contributors, and cement polit-
ical power. There is a good reason why patronage is no longer wide-
spread. Even in small amounts, politically motivated hiring and firing
of public employees demeans government service.
The Commission's conclusions about the role of patronage in gov-
ernment stems from a highly publicized investigation we conducted
into certain hiring practices of the City of New York. The investiga-
tion uncovered a patronage program run out of the Mayor's Talent
Bank and City Hall between 1983 and 1986 that seriously under-
mined the merit selection process and subverted the affirmative action
objectives of the Talent Bank. According to the testimony, job candi-
dates referred by political leaders were given preferential treatment in
hiring, including exclusive rights to compete for some of the highest
paid unskilled positions. In at least two agencies - the City Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection and the City Department of Trans-
portation - officials were pressured to hire politically connected
candidates over others that the agencies preferred and thought were
more qualified.
24. Professor Rosenbloom is the Distinguished Professor of Administration at the
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.
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Employees of the agency testified they feared retaliation if they
didn't "play ball" with City Hall.25 They were forced to alter legiti-
mate agency needs - sometimes creating jobs for politically con-
nected candidates and filling positions they had not intended to staff.
Despite a mayoral directive making the posting of all jobs obligatory,
laborer vacancies at these agencies were neither posted nor advertised.
Instead these desirable jobs which previously required no more than
good health and a driver's license took on a new prerequisite - a
referral from City Hall.
Patronage has several detrimental effects on the functioning of gov-
ernment. First, hard-working public servants are demoralized when
they see appointments made mainly for political reasons. In fact, the
professionalism of the government's work force is debased. As Rob-
ert Jean, a former Personnel Director at the New York City Depart-
ment of Transportation, testified before the Commission:
It was difficult on the part of some of my subordinates when they
saw somebody - someone who they had signed up and who they
knew did not sound like someone who was capable or someone
they dealt with that they knew was incapable, and they would be
getting a large increase and they would know that through that
person's connections either politically or personally, that they got
there. It had a bad effect.26
Patronage insidiously attacks the best government employees. The
most professional public servants, the ones that are deeply committed
to the mission of their agency, experience that much more frustration
when they see the mission obscured by political considerations. These
employees feel ethically compromised when they "play ball," and are
forced to participate in the patronage practices they find offensive.
Cynicism, resentment and resignation are the sure results.
Second, the efficiency of government operations is impaired. Merit
selection means hiring the people with the best qualifications who will
do the best job for the tax dollars spent on their salary. Patronage
means hiring the people with the best connections. Witnesses said in
sworn testimony before the Commission that sometimes in order to
justify hiring a politically connected candidate for a laborer job, a rat-
ing would be fudged so that the candidate looked qualified.
Third, even if used in a limited way, partronage undermines demo-
25. For more information on the New York City patronage investigations, please see
our report, "PLAYING BALL" WITH CITY HALL: A CASE STUDY OF POLITICAL PA-
TRONAGE IN NEW YORK CITY (August 1989).
26. Transcript of April 4, 1989 hearing on political patronage practices in New York
City, at 63.
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cratic government. Government is supposed to be accountable only
to the people; patronage subordinates government to unaccountable
private political powers. Citizens vote leaders into office with the un-
derstanding that those leaders will use the resources of government to
serve the interests of the citizens. That is what "public service is a
public trust" means. Using those resources for political aggrandize-
ment betrays that trust.
Finally, patronage discourages whistleblowing. Patronage employ-
ees, particularly provisional employees, generally have little job secur-
ity. Losing one's job is a strong deterrent to speaking out about
corruption.
Abolishing patronage is crucial to the quest for ethical government.
Patronage may be legal, but its destructive effects reach outside the
door of any particular agency to touch all citizens. Even if the
number of personnel actions tainted by politics is limited, patronage
shakes the public's confidence that government is serving their inter-
ests rather than those of powerful political figures.
Although the Commission's investigation focused on the problems
of patronage in the New York City personnel system, its lessons apply
beyond the city's limits. First of all, having a person in the Mayor's
office with absolute power over hires, promotions, transfers and salary
increases can be destructive. In the case we investigated, this power
was misused by pressuring agencies to hire political referrals. Such
control also adds an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy to decision-
making that should be left to professionals in public personnel
administration.
Second, it should go without saying, yet sadly needs to be said, that
hiring should be done openly and fairly. This means the posting of
job vacancies should be required by law. And for positions such as
laborers, where skills testing is not appropriate, other procedures,
such as a lottery, should be used to give everyone - whether or not
they have political connections - an equal shot at obtaining a job.
Third, for reasons of policy, it is important for a Mayor to be able
to select a few senior staff who will be directly accountable to him,
serve at his pleasure and wholeheartedly share his agenda. However,
merit must be the first concern in making these type of appointments,
and they should be handled through a separate Appointments Office
to ensure that.
Fourth and most fundamentally, hiring large numbers of people
outside the civil service system lends itself readily to patronage. In
New York City, where approximately 30% or 45,000 employees are
in discretionary positions, it is critical that the personnel system be
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overhauled. Although the civil service system may be in a state of
crisis, large-scale discretionary hiring is not the solution to its
problems.
Most reasonable people would agree that government jobs are not
commodities for politicians to trade for power and favors and that
politically-connected candidates should not be given advantages over
others. Yet many say there is nothing inherently wrong with pa-
tronage. They fail to understand that by definition patronage involves
this type of trading and favoritism. It is wrong to shrug off patronage
as the way things are. It is time we made our government the way it
should be.
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MUNICIPAL ETHICS
The very essence of a free government consists in considering
offices as public trusts, bestowed for the good of the country, and
not for the benefit of an individual or a party.
John Caldwell Calhoun
Speech, February 13, 1835
He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be
compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the
stars turn towards it.
Confucius
Having this type of legislation [ethics and financial disclosure
law] within our town, we think lends greater credibility and integ-
rity to the people serving within the community.
Raymond O'Connor
Councilman, Wilton, New York27
In 1987, the State Legislature passed the Ethics in Government Act
[Act or Ethics Act], regulating the behavior of executive and legisla-
tive branch officials and employees. Although the Act can be im-
proved, it is far better than what it replaced, and represents an
important first step.28 It only applies to state officials, however, and in
one minor way to municipalities of more than 50,000 residents. More
than 95% of the municipalities in the state are completely unaffected
by the 1987 Act. Yet clear and consistent ethical standards are just as
important for local public officials.
At present, local officials are only regulated by inadequate and
vague legislation passed more than 20 years ago. The legislation inad-
equately defines conflicts of interest, and requires each county, city,
town, village and school district to adopt its own code of ethics. Mu-
nicipalities are permitted to create ethics boards that can only issue
advisory opinions; the boards do not have the authority to conduct
investigations, levy sanctions, or to enforce the law in other ways.
27. Transcript of November 22, 1988 public hearing on proposed Municipal Ethics
Act, at 92. Wilton, located in Saratoga County, has a population of approximately 9,000.
28. For more on the 1987 State Ethics in Government Act, see supra notes 9-13 and
accompanying text.
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The result has been a confusing and often contradictory patchwork
of unenforced and unenforceable ethics codes. New York needs a set
of minimum ethical standards for all public officials, a statement that
certain behavior is simply not acceptable for a government servant, no
matter where he or she works and lives. Such a law would bring legal
and ethical standards closer together, provide critical guidance for the
multitude of public servants whose honesty and integrity are above
reproach, reduce the pressure brought on local officials by private in-
terests, and deter abuse by those who taint the reputations of all by
using their public office for private gain.
In December of 1988, we proposed a Municipal Ethics Act [Pro-
posed Act] that sets uniform ethical standards for all municipalities in
New York State. These standards are intended only as a minimum;
localities can adopt more stringent legislation where they feel it is ap-
propriate to do so. In some areas - particularly in smaller towns and
villages - extensive requirements might discourage public service,
and we have tried to make our Act's demands as moderate as an effec-
tive ethics law permits. The Governor has proposed legislation based
on our recommendations. We hope that with sufficient local support,
this bill will be enacted into law.
Disclosure Requirements
Current law does not require local officials to disclose any meaning-
ful information about their finances, making it almost impossible for
the public to spot potential and actual conflicts of interest. Although
the 1987 Ethics Act requires municipalities over 50,000 inhabitants to
adopt their own financial disclosure requirements by January 1, 1991,
these requirements do not have to meet any minimum standard. 29 A
municipality could literally meet the dictates of the 1987 Act with a
form that asked only for an official's name, business address, and
whether the official made between $500 and $1 million in the previous
year. Obviously, more needs to be done.
Our [P]roposed Act mandates three types of disclosure: applicant
disclosure for individuals making bids for municipal business; annual
disclosure by all elected and paid municipal officials of personal finan-
cial interests; and transactional disclosure for situations where the offi-
cial's actions may be personally profitable. The applicant disclosure
requirement is a simple safeguard against hidden conflicts of interest.
It obliges anyone making a bid for public business to disclose any
29. New York City is the one exception and is required by the 1987 Act to have
disclosure requirements at least as strict as those the Act mandates for state officeholders
and employees. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 811 (McKinney 1987).
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campaign contribution of $250 or more to any local official, and to
reveal the nature of any officer's or employee's "interest" in either the
application or the applicant.3a
The annual disclosure requirement mandates that elected and paid
public officials with authority over the government's business dealings
reveal basic information about their personal finances.3' Opponents
of annual disclosure claim that any requirement is an unfair invasion
of privacy so onerous it will discourage qualified people from consid-
ering government service. Our investigations reveal that this fear is
groundless. Nineteen other states, and several counties, cities and
towns in New York, currently require annual disclosure. None report
any shortage of good people willing to serve in local government. An-
nual financial disclosure for public officials is a vital tool in preventing
conflicts of interest and assuring citizens that government decisions
are made for public, not private, betterment.
The current law also inadequately and inappropriately deals with
conflicts of interest. Current law prohibits municipal officers and em-
ployees from having a direct or indirect "interest" in the municipal-
ity's contracts if they have the power or duty to take some action on
the contract. Such an absolute ban often runs counter to the public
interest. For example, it may be less expensive and more convenient
for a small municipality to contract with a town supervisor's snow
removal company to clear the streets or with a planning board chair-
man's construction company to do renovation work on the town hall.
The transactional disclosure requirement proposed by the Commis-
sion is a more effective and realistic response than the absolute ban in
the present law. It requires that local officials disclose their interests
in a public contract and take no official action involving the contract.
30. A municipal officer or employee is defined to have an "interest" when the officer
or employee or their spouse: is the applicant, or a family member of the applicant; owns
more than 5% of the stock of the applicant; has or intends to enter into an employment,
professional, business or financial relationship with the applicant; has received from the
applicant, during one year of the previous two, a benefit of more than $2,000; or will
receive a benefit if the municipality's disposition is favorable to the applicant. Proposed
Municipal Ethics Act § 9(4), New York State Commission on Government Integrity (De-
cember 1988) [hereinafter Proposed Act]. Violation of this provision of the Act subjects
the applicant to misdemeanor prosecution. Proposed Act § 9(5).
31. Officials must reveal their real estate holdings in the municipality or within five
miles of the municipality; employers' names; ownership interests in businesses and corpo-
rations; self-employment over $2,000; and for those who are licensed professionals-such
as lawyers-a description of their area of expertise and the nature of their clients' busi-
nesses. No dollar amounts or client names must be disclosed. The public official must
similarly disclose his or her spouse's information, and the real estate holdings of all fam-
ily members of the household. The [Proposed] Act provides relief for public officials who
are unable, after reasonable efforts, to obtain such information.
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After that, if the other non-interested decision-makers in the govern-
ment decide that the official's firm is the best for the job, then the best
firm gets the contract, and the public is kept informed. In situations
where there is no actual contract, officials would still disclose their
interest in the matter and abstain from taking any official action on it.
Conflicts of Interest
Almost by definition, public officials must act in the public interest
without consideration of their personal business relationships. Yet
current law allows public officials to represent private clients on busi-
ness matters before the municipality. Permitting such relationships
openly invites conflicts of interest and other abuses.
For example, in one upstate city, the head of the water department
purchased $12,000 worth of supplies from a company in the area.
The official never disclosed to anyone in the town government that he
also was a vice president in the company, its sales representative in
surrounding communities; and that he had loaned the company more
than $60,000, and had leased almost $15,000 worth of equipment to
the company. The official clearly had a direct conflict of interest, and
should not have been involved in purchasing. Yet three separate in-
vestigations determined the official did not violate the current law.
That he did not says far more about the current law than about his
behavior. The official's relationship would be revealed under all of
our [Proposed] Act's disclosure requirements32 and the official actions
he took to benefit the company would be punishable 33 as a
misdemeanor.
Revolving door
One of the most serious shortcomings of the current law is the lack
of any restrictions on employment after leaving municipal govern-
ment. Such restrictions have become commonplace at other levels of
government. Commission investigations have revealed occasions
where the "revolving door" from the public sector to the private sec-
tor spun far too fast.
In one town, the chairman of the planning commission resigned,
and withinfour days, was soliciting consulting work from developers,
specifically hawking his government experience and contacts. He was
hired by the developers and represented them before town agencies on
the very same projects he had acted on as chairman. This kind of
32. Proposed Act, supra note 30, § 4(1)(a).
33. Proposed Act, supra note 30, § 4(8).
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behavior is terribly damaging to public confidence in government, at a
minimum. Why should people believe that his official actions were
anything more than a payment for a lucrative future in private life?
Our [Proposed] Act allows former municipal officials to work for any-
one they choose, but bars them from accepting or soliciting employ-
ment on any particular matter they had discretionary power over
while serving the public.34
Of course, without adequate enforcement, any reform proposals are
practically meaningless. Our [Proposed] Act would create powerful
and independent municipal or regional ethics boards with the author-
ity to investigate violations, conduct hearings, subpoena documents
and witnesses, impose tough sanctions and issue advisory opinions.
Elected officials are elected to serve the common good and most do
serve the common good diligently, honestly, and without the salary
and recognition many in the private sector enjoy. Some do not, and
their behavior can taint the reputations of all hard-working govern-
ment employees. Vague ethics laws - like New York's - and an
understandably suspicious public make every government official vul-
nerable to arbitrary attacks and unfounded accusation and rumor.
The Commission's proposed Municipal Ethics Act would strengthen
local democracy and help to build the faith of New York's citizens in
their representatives.
34. This does not include the proposal, consideration or enactment of local laws, ordi-
nances or regulations of general application. Proposed Act, supra note 30, §§ 3(11), 3(4),
4(l)(k).
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE: STATEWIDE OFFICEHOLDERS
It is a terrible system. It is a terrible system, and the only argu-
ment I hear against campaign financing is, you know, it is a polit-
ical welfare system. I am utterly unimpressed by the arguments
against public financing. It comes down to judgments by individ-
ual incumbents, mostly, as to what is best for them.
Governor Mario Cuomo
Testimony before the New York State
Commission on Government Integrity (September 9, 1987)
Elections are the central democratic event in our political system.
It is essential that they be conducted in a manner above scandal, sus-
picion and impropriety. When people stop having confidence in the
integrity of the electoral process, the consequences for democracy are
dire. A healthy democracy depends on public faith that officials serve
the public trust, not private interest. Those who believe the system is
fixed in favor of the wealthy and connected have little reason to vote
or even to recognize the legitimacy of elected officials.
In a poll conducted for the Commission in 1988, 78% of the regis-
tered voters in New York believed they had too little influence over
state government decisions; only 27% believed that most people run-
ning for public office are honest; and a solid plurality felt that the
candidate that raised the most money usually won. Unfortunately, so
far our political leaders have not taken the steps to reform the lax
New York State laws on political fund-raising that contribute to this
deep cynicism.
The Commission investigated and held hearings on the fund-raising
practices of New York's statewide elected officials - Governor Mario
Cuomo, Attorney General Robert Abrams and Comptroller Edward
Regan - that clearly demonstrated the enormous pressures on candi-
dates to solicit campaign funds from a select group of wealthy special
interests. These pressures will persist until the current system is
reformed.
In testimony before the Commission, every statewide official said
that fund-raising was the most distasteful activity he had to perform.
Yet despite their distaste, these officials are consummate fund-raisers
with extremely effective fund-raising organizations that operate even
when the next election is two or three years away.
Fund-raising ability may not be relevant to serving the public trust
but it is an absolute prerequisite to getting elected in the first place.
Good ideas do not matter unless they are heard, and getting them
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heard in the modem world of New York politics means spending mil-
lions of dollars. Air time alone for a single 30-second prime time tele-
vision commercial can cost as much as $30,000. In addition,
candidates must hire an array of expensive pollsters, media consul-
tants, and public relations advisors. These huge costs mean that fund-
raising is an unending process demanding a public official's constant
attention.
The preoccupation with fund-raising undermines the political pro-
cess. Running for public office takes a great deal of money now, and
it will take even more in the future. The source of those funds must
be changed. They should come from a broad base of support rather
than from the wealthy few who often have a direct financial stake in
the decisions the candidate will make as an officeholder. Unfortu-
nately, in the current system, it is the giant gifts of gilded special in-
terests that provide the cornerstone for financing political campaigns
in New York State.
The current law allows basically unlimited contributions by corpo-
rations, unions, and those doing business with the state. The current
limit on an individual's political contributions is an absurdly high
$150,000 per year - which does not include gifts by dependent chil-
dren or other family members.3a The limit on corporate contributions
is just as chimerical: $5,000 per year, not including gifts by subsidiary
and affiliated corporations.a6 Creating a subsidiary corporation is a
simple and inexpensive legal procedure; developers, for example, often
incorporate each building they construct. The Attorney General's
campaign director summed up the current law in a memo to one such
developer:
Any corporate entity, no matter how closely related to any other
corporate entity, may contribute up to $5,000 to political candi-
dates in a calendar year. For example, if [your firm] consists of ten
buildings, and each building is separately incorporated, each build-
ing may contribute up to $5,000, even though all of these corpora-
tions may have the same Board of Directors, officers, etc.
In sum, any corporate entity that you or your family control may
give up to $5,000 per calendar year to political candidates for non-
federal office.37
Corporations have poured millions of dollars through this huge loop-
hole every election. These gifts are particularly insidious. Corpora-
tions are not people. They do not have the vote. They exist to make
35. N.Y. ELECT. LAW § 14-114(1) (McKinney 1978).
36. N.Y. ELECT. LAW § 14-116(2) (McKinney 1978).
37. Transcript of March 10, 1989 hearing on campaign finance, Exhibit 22.
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money for the people that own them; they do not have a political
ideology or particular beliefs. By definition, corporate contributions
represent a business decision, an attempt to influence the political sys-
tem or to purchase access, or avert some negative result. Corpora-
tions should not be allowed to use their vast wealth and resources to
influence elections or to pretend that they are constituents of the
political process.
Even more basic, contributions from those that do business with
the government must be prohibited. Allowing groups that depend on
the government's business to make gifts to the same people deciding
who gets the government's business is an open invitation to public
cynicism and potential corruption. More than 90% of the Comptrol-
ler's campaign funds in the period January, 1985 to July, 1988, came
from industries that do business with his office. More than 90% of
the engineers who received contracts during 1984-87 from the New
York State Department of Transportation and from the State
Thruway Authority made contributions to the State Democratic
Party campaign committee or Governor Cuomo's campaign commit-
tee between 1982 and 1987.38 The appearance of influence-seeking
created by gifts from people doing business with government is terri-
ble. The system that forces candidates to reach out to such groups
that do business with government so they can generate enough cam-
paign funds to be competitive is worse.
The links between fund-raising and official actions go beyond
targeting industry groups for solicitation. Although each of the state-
wide officials tries to keep his official and political roles separate, they
often use top aides from their offices for campaign purposes. When
staff members work on the campaign, this separation begins to break
down, and adds to the perception on the part of those solicited that
contributions buy access and influence. High level staff members
talked to the Commission about the difficulty they have in purging
from their minds the knowledge that a given person they are dealing
with is also a major contributor. As the Comptroller's campaign
committee chairman stated, "I think you've hit the heart of what's
wrong with our system, and it cries out for reform."3 9 Particularly
with statewide races, an officeholder's top aides should be barred from
campaign fund-raising. Without such a separation, it is inevitable
that some contributors will perceive a link between their gifts and
38. Engineers do not typically contribute to other campaign committees.
39. Transcript of September 19, 1988 Commission Deposition Huntington; transcript
of September 24, 1989 hearing, Exhibit 1.
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official action. Without such a separation, we come uncomfortably
close to legalizing bribery or extortion.
Enforcement
Without adequate enforcement, reforms are meaningless. Unfortu-
nately, the Board of Elections has so far proved itself unable to en-
force even the simple regulations we now have. One reason has been
complacency. The second reason, born of this complacency, is the
Board's failure, over the years, to use computers to record and ana-
lyze the campaign finance information that candidates and party com-
mittees are required to disclose. Without computers, enforcing rules
as basic as contribution limits has been impossible and the public is
denied easy access to data that is vital to an informed vote. When one
employee of the Board attempted to introduce a modest computer in-
formation system, Board officials told him they "[did not] want that
type of data leaving the agency. '
Beginning in late 1987, our Commission, with limited funds and no
special technological expertise, computerized all the contribution
records - going back five years or more - for the State Legislature,
the statewide elected officials, the New York Citywide elected officials
and the New York City Council. For the first time in the history of
our state, the public received basic information about who is paying
the fare to bring their leaders to office, in a format that allows easy
analysis. This type of computerized information is available on the
federal level and in many other states. It is appalling that a tempo-
rary Commission like ours was forced to spend valuable time and
money performing a task that should have been taken care of as a
matter of course by the Board of Elections.
In addition to computerizing campaign finance information, for
two years, the Commission detailed the Board's failings. We held
public hearings, issued reports and testified before the State Senate
and Assembly. The Board of Elections seems to have responded.
They have hired a computer specialist who has begun to design a
comprehensive system to pick up where the Commission has left off.
They have even purchased computers. But this equipment will sit idle
without the money to hire qualified staff and unfortunately, the Legis-
lature has, so far, failed to fund this praiseworthy effort. This failure
is more vivid evidence of the need for a separate campaign finance
enforcement agency, well-funded and independent of the officeholders
40. Transcript of March 15, 1988 hearing, at 43.
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it is supposed to police.4"
Public financing
Better enforcement, tough contribution limits, stricter disclosure
requirements and a ban on contributions by corporations, unions and
those that do business with the government, would all be great im-
provements in New York's campaign finance system. But none of
these reforms go to the heart of the problem.
Running for statewide office is enormously expensive. Because less
than one-tenth of one percent of the citizens of New York make polit-
ical contributions in the state, it is simply impossible to finance a cred-
ible statewide candidacy without relying on large contributions by
wealthy special interests. No reforms will make it possible for the
average citizen to afford a $1,000 political contribution, much less a
$50,000 contribution.
New York State must institute a program to use public funds to pay
part of the cost of campaigns for statewide office. Such a program
would provide a constitutional way to limit campaign expenditures,
would ensure that a challenger has enough money to mount a credible
campaign, and would strengthen the bond between candidates and the
taxpaying public they serve. Public funding would make the citizens
of New York the special interest of every candidate.
Conclusion
The public's basic faith in democratic institutions depends on the
belief that leaders are elected fairly; that the democratic arena is open,
equitable and just. The way we finance political campaigns in New
York is too important an issue to be ducked or ignored. The stakes
are high, and correspondingly, the regulations governing campaign
financing should be clear and strict.
New York's regulations are anything but clear and strict. Their
problems have been well-documented by our Commission and other
groups. The Governor, the Attorney General, the Comptroller, the
leaders of the State Senate and State Assembly, and the Mayor,
Comptroller and City Council President of New York City, have all
appeared before us and publicly promised their support for some re-
form in the system. Yet, at least on the state level,42 no essential re-
41. If fiscal constraints make formation of a separate campaign finance enforcement
impossible, the Board should be substantially reorganized. A separate Campaign Finance
Enforcement Office should be set up within the Board; it should be headed by a Director
that reports directly to the Board's officers.
42. In 1988, New York City passed a new campaign finance law which is a substantial
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forms of New York's fundamentally corrupt campaign finance system
have been enacted into law.
The difficulty of reforming campaign funding practices is directly
related to their importance to incumbents and the wealthy special in-
terests that support them. We are asking our leaders to look beyond
narrow self-interest, to give up a measure of security, to change the
system that has brought them to power. We are asking them to do
this because our public officials are pledged to hold the public trust
above personal gain. It is time they enacted the campaign finance
reforms that New York needs and New Yorkers deserve.
improvement over the state's regulations and provides matching public funds for candi-
dates. On the state level, a Commission investigation stimulated the Legislature to re-
quire political party organizations to reveal the finances of their "housekeeping
accounts." Previously, large contributions were allowed to be deposited, in secret, into
these accounts as long as the money was used for the operation of party offices and not to
support candidates. However, account expenditures were also secret. The secrecy was an
invitation to abuse. Our investigations show that invitation has been accepted.
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UNFAIR INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE
What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.
Confucius
"To, the victor belong the spoils" is not the code of conduct we
expect from victorious candidates for public office. Unfortunately,
some incumbent officeholders act as if the public resources they con-
trol are theirs to use as they see fit in subsequent election campaigns.
Because campaigning is a private function, this amounts to a sneaky
public subsidy that can seriously disadvantage an opponent who does
not hold office.
In election campaigns, many of the advantages of incumbency oc-
cur naturally - through the very acts of governing and creating a
record of achievement. This advantage - heightened by incum-
bents' high visibility at ceremonial events, speeches and press confer-
ences, all usually well-covered by the media - cannot and should not
be regulated.
Other incumbent advantages are no more naturally occurring than
the Los Angeles smog. They result from the unregulated use of public
resources for campaign activity, and by allowing incumbents to use
public employees as a pool from which to solicit campaign workers
and contributions. There is no New York State law that specifically
addresses this problem. 3 But there should be.
Most forms of campaign activity have no reasonable connection to
serving the public. The use of public resources should be outlawed for
fund-raising efforts and other election activities such as organizing
campaign events, preparation and distribution of campaign literature,
creating campaign advertisements, giving campaign "stump" speeches
and the like.4"
43. Although the State Constitution prohibits using public resources in aid of private
activity, and the courts have held that campaigning for political office is private activity,
efforts to prosecute such conduct are fraught with problems. See N.Y. CONST. art. VII,
§ 7. Chief among them is the absence of any clear delineation between what is "campaign
related" and what is "related to official duties." Neither New York Civil Service Law
Section 107(3), prohibiting the solicitation of campaign contributions in public buildings,
nor Public Officers Law Section 74(d), forbidding a public officer or employee from "[us-
ing] his official position to secure unwarranted privileges... for himself or others," is
sufficiently specific or comprehensive to bar the inappropriate conduct the Commission
has found.
44. Public resources would include public money, facilities, time or information com-
piled for government purposes and not generally available to the public. The ban on the
use of public time should not apply to elected officials who have no fixed workday. They
should be allowed to define the time they spend performing their official duties.
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However, not all campaign activity is so easy to define and to spot.
The definition may depend on the circumstances. Let's look at a hy-
pothetical example: During a re-election campaign, a District Attor-
ney delivers a Monday morning speech on women's rights to a local
chapter of the National Organization for Women. A public employee
has prepared the speech on office time, using office equipment and the
D.A. has been driven to the meeting by two detectives in an office car.
Is this reasonably related to the D.A.'s job or is it campaign activity?
What if the speech touched on discrimination against women in the
courts and the lack of counseling facilities for victims of rape and
spouse battering? What if it did not?
The list of activities that falls into this twilight zone between gov-
ernment work and recognized campaign activity is varied and depen-
dent on circumstances impossible to anticipate. Any law must leave to
an enforcment agency the task of defining activity that is not reason-
ably part of official duties.45 If an incumbent were found to have im-
properly used public resources in an election effort, he or she could be
compelled by the enforcement agency to reimburse the public treas-
ury. Under this approach, incumbents would know they were being
scrutinized and would feel the consequences of the bad publicity that
would surely result from inappropriate activity.46 This alone could be
a powerful deterrent to wrongfully dipping into the public purse.
Another way in which incumbents can magically convert tax dol-
lars into campaign contributions is through mass mailings and other
forms of mass communication at election time. This practice is an
abuse of the public trust, yet sadly - as any observer of modern cam-
paigns knows - it is widespread.
The Commission has seen examples of campaigning incumbents
spending tax dollars for communications ranging from billboards and
bumper stickers to pamphlets, radio ads and Halloween trick-or-treat
45. We recommended on December 21, 1987, in "Campaign Financing: Preliminary
Report," that a separate Campaign Finance Enforcement Agency assume the campaign
finance enforcement responsibility that the State Board of Elections has, but consistently
neglects. This is the agency that we envision would provide guidance to incumbents con-
cerning what is inappropriate use of public resources, and where needed, strong
enforcement.
46. There may be occasions where the intrusion of campaign activity into official time
is incidental and unavoidable. For example, if an official travels at public expense to an
official function and on the same trip also makes a campaign speech, the official should
reimburse the state for the prorated cost of travel to the site for campaign-related pur-
poses. Colorado has a law similar to the one we are proposing and, according to the
Election Officer at the Colorado Office of the Secretary of State, the law is almost self-
enforcing.
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bags, all featuring prominently the incumbent's name, picture or
voice.
These communications may be of value to the public; many convey
health and safety information, such as the hazards of drinking and
driving or a drug hotline number. Nonetheless, their public purpose
is far outweighed by their campaign usefulness and potential unfair-
ness to a non-incumbent opponent.
Officials obviously need to communicate with their constituents,
but during an election their communications can also unfairly pro-
mote their candidacy. The solution is a law that would ban the public
financing of mass communications that bear the name or picture or, in
the case of TV and radio, the voice of any candidate."
One of the most important assets in any political campaign, in addi-
tion to abundant cash, is people. Campaign workers are the backbone
of election races. Here too, incumbents have a big advantage over
challengers. They control a pool of public employees that can be
asked to make campaign contributions or to perform campaign work
during off-hours. Challengers do not.
Public employees who testified before the Commission about being
asked, while they were at work, to volunteer after-hours on a cam-
paign, said they resented the solicitation and felt demoralized and
their professionalism demeaned by the request. Others said they com-
plied because they thought it would help their careers or that the boss
would take notice.4" This should not be allowed.
Elections are the central event in a democracy; they are the compe-
titions that make our way of life possible. Yet in New York State
electoral contests, the rules and absence of rules favor the prior vic-
tors. First, as we have pointed out earlier in this report, the law con-
trolling who gets on the ballot causes challengers, who often do not
have access to expensive election lawyers and legions of political party
workers, to be tossed off the ballot for frivolous reasons.49 Second,
current campaign contribution laws, which allow virtually unlimited
sums from corporations and those doing business with government,
also clearly favor incumbents. And third, incumbents' unregulated
use of public resources for campaign purposes stack the deck against
challengers.
47. The prohibition should apply from the first day that nominating petitions are
circulated. In the few cases where candidates do not circulate petitions, the restriction
should apply from the time they are nominated for public office.
48. See NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, EVENING
THE ODDS: THE NEED TO RESTRICT UNFAIR INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE Appendix II, at
6 (October 31, 1989).
49. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1990-91] 217
218 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
It is ironic that the only people who have the power to mandate fair
play in the State's election campaigns are the ones who benefit from
the present one-sided system. We must no longer permit them to per-
petuate such fundamental unfairness in the most important form of
competition in America.
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CONTRACTING PRACTICES AT THE STATE DIVISION OF
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
To me this is a critical point in this country. Are you committed
to [drug] treatment or aren't you?... You can't do it with smoke
and mirrors and rhetoric.
Governor Mario M. Cuomo
(January 3, 1990)
No one is out of harm's way. When 4-year-olds play in play-
grounds strewn with discarded hypodermic needles and crack vials
- it breaks my heart. When cocaine - one of the most deadly
and addictive illegal drugs - is available to school kids - school
kids - it's an outrage .... It's time we expand our treatment
systems and do a better job of providing services to those who need
them.
President George Bush
(September 5, 1989)
Drug abuse is ruining people's lives everywhere - from urban
ghettos to Wall Street. There is now a consensus among top elected
officials that unless treatment is available for addicts, we cannot win
the war on drugs. Stepped-up prosecution alone will not solve the
problem.
In New York State the Division of Substance Abuse Services
(DSAS) provides drug education, methadone maintenance and drug-
free therapeutic treatment by awarding contracts to privately oper-
ated programs, usually not-for-profit.50 Eighty percent of DSAS'
budget goes for services in New York City and Long Island, where, it
is estimated, a million addicts live. Since the mid-1980's when crack
use exploded, close to half a billion dollars has been awarded to drug-
free therapeutic treatment programs in the City.51
Even though DSAS doesn't actually deliver services itself, but
rather "purchases" them, it still has a duty to the taxpayers and to
addicts seeking help to get value for the money it spends. This can
50. DSAS is one of two divisions within the Office of Alcoholism and Substance
Abuse Services. The other is the Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse. The Office
is part of the State Department of Mental Hygiene.
51. Drug-free therapeutic treatment, unlike methadone maintenance which is effec-
tive in helping heroin addicts only, does not involve the use of a prescription drug and is
used to help cocaine and crack users too.
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only happen if programs are held to high performance standards. In
addition, fair and open competition is as important in the awarding of
DSAS grants as it is in the marketplace. If the contracting process
lacks these characteristics, it is vulnerable to influence-peddling, fa-
voritism, and the squandering of tax dollars.
Part of DSAS' response to the crack crisis was to fund four pro-
posed residential drug-free treatment programs in New York City.
Because the agency's contracting process is bereft of competition or
adequate controls and the former Director disdained what few rules
do exist, the handling of these contracts is a case study in how to
waste tax dollars while helping friends. 52 In fact, personal relation-
ships with the former Director smoothed the way for funding of each
program and interfered with the ability of the agency's contract man-
agement staff to assure quality performance and accountability.
53
Three of the four programs failed to treat a single addict.
One of the four programs, known as Young Adults in Transition
Center (YATC), was proposed by a long-time friend of the then Di-
rector. The friend had already received over $2.2 million in DSAS
funding for a day program that had a history of financial irregularities
and extremely poor performance. Despite this history, the Director
made a commitment to fund YATC, bypassing the agency's contract
management staff and securing his friend nearly $974,000 from 1986
to 1989 for a treatment program in Queens that never treated anyone.
In another case the Director and the Deputy Director for Chemo-
therapy Services usurped the role of DSAS' contract management
staff and committed $174,253 to a proposed residential drug-free
treatment program backed by another friend, a wealthy business-
man.54 Although all the money was spent, the program never materi-
alized. During the contract period, DSAS staff - aware of the great
personal interest in the contract at the highest levels of the agency -
52. The Commission conducted a one-year investigation of how DSAS awarded and
managed the contracts for these four programs. Our findings and recommendations for
improving the integrity and effectiveness of the agency's contracting practices are con-
tained in a Commission report, EXPANDING DRUG TREATMENT: THE NEED FOR FAIR
CONTRACTING PRACTICES (December 14, 1989). Our investigation did not establish
whether the four programs are typical of other DSAS-funded programs. However, the
favoritism and waste of agency resources found in each of the four stemmed from weak-
nesses in leadership and in the contracting system that can undermine the effectiveness of
every DSAS-funded program.
53. The contract management staff has day-to-day responsibility for evaluating pro-
posals and negotiating and monitoring contracts; the Director does not.
54. The Deputy Director's involvement in this contract was inappropriate because his
official responsibility was the oversight of methadone maintenance programs and had
nothing to do with drug-free treatment programs.
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either ignored or failed to detect serious conflicts of interest and finan-
cial irregularities involving the businessman, some of which resulted
in higher costs. These included the use of DSAS funds to pay for a
rarely used "office" which turned out to be a one-bedroom apartment
in a fashionable New York City neighborhood rented by the business-
man and sublet to the program.
Another friend of the former Director was able to bypass com-
pletely DSAS' contract management staff to secure a $2 million con-
tract to provide drug-free residential treatment to 40 clients in
Brooklyn. Although $1 million has been spent since July, 1986 the
facility has not yet opened and will cost over $500,000 to renovate.
This contract too has been plagued with irregulaities, including the
payment of four full-time staff salaries at a virtually nonexistent
program.
DSAS also bungled its contract with National Expert Care Consul-
tants (NECC), a profit-making treatment provider whose president's
personal access to DSAS' then Director helped him obtain $4 million
between July, 1986 and March, 1988. DSAS has no guidelines or reg-
ulations for dealing with profit-making ventures yet went ahead and
awarded, without competition, a contract that authorized NECC to
earn over half a million dollars in profit and then to turn its program
for indigent clients into a business serving fee-paying clients instead.
The business operates in a prime mid-Manhattan location at a build-
ing purchased with state funds.
Favoritism and informality in DSAS' contracting practices are two
elements in an equation that added up to waste and fraud. A third
element of the problem is the absence of a local substance abuse
agency in New York City. This is the City's responsibility. Nearly
everywhere else in the State, county social service agencies are respon-
sible for determining community drug treatment needs, advocating
for state funds and selecting private treatment providers. In New
York City, DSAS' regulatory responsibilities have been given a back
seat as its advocacy for treatment programs has driven the agency to
throw good money after bad. DSAS has become hostage to the New
York City programs it is supposed toregulate. Its pursuit of conflict-
ing functions - as a regulator and an advocate - assures that neither
is carried out successfully. The creation of a New York City sub-
stance abuse agency would ease the conflict between these two impor-
tant missions.
But as long as DSAS continues its direct involvement in con-
tracting with drug treatment providers in New York City, it must
reform all stages of the process. There must be competition for funds,
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with no more grants to friends who make personal appeals to top
agency officials. DSAS must strictly monitor the start-up period of a
contract to assure that good money is not thrown after bad. Once a
program begins treating addicts, DSAS must enforce high perform-
ance standards and impose penalties where programs fall short or
spend money inappropriately.
New York State's recent efforts to expand the number of residential
drug treatment programs in New York City were thwarted by flawed
contracting practices: a bad response to a desperate program. The
Governor has replaced DSAS' Director, an important starting point
for reform. But much remains to be done to assure that drug treat-
ment funds are used effectively and not wasted.
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NEW YORK CITY'S CONTRACTING PRACTICES
A lack of management control can, all by itself, provide opportuni-
ties for corruption. In addition, it can magnify existing opportuni-
ties and minimize the risks that attend them. Paradoxically, too
much control can have the same effect as too little.
United States Justice Department,
National Institute of Justice (1980)
Contracting is the lifeblood of New York City's' operations. Each
year the City spends more than $6.5 billion on contracts for an array
of supplies, equipment, services and construction. The City buys two-
way radios, unmarked police cars and bullet-proof vests for police of-
ficers who patrol its streets. It buys food for homeless families and
finds contractors to paint and repair City-run homeless shelters. It
hires security guards to protect City buildings, contractors to repair
City streets and construction firms to renovate City housing."
The problems facing New York City's contracting system have
reached a state of crisis, no less real and no less serious than the more
conspicuous problems facing the City. The system wastes millions of
taxpayer dollars - dollars that otherwise could be spent fighting
crime, drug abuse and homelessness. It is mired in red tape, hostile to
vendors and vulnerable to corruption.
Competition is the sine qua non of a healthy contracting system; it
is needed to keep down costs and corruption. Prosecutors have long
recognized that where municipal contracts are let to a narrow group
of firms, opportunities for corruption abound. Indeed, a question-
naire developed by the United States Justice Department to assist citi-
zens in assessing "whether official corruption or an atmosphere that is
conducive to official corruption might exist in their city or state gov-
ernment" asks as its first two questions: 1. Do respected and well-
qualified companies refuse to do business with the city or state? 2.
55. Responsibility for the City's purchasing operations varies depending on what is
purchased, how the contract is awarded and the dollar amount spent. The lion's share of
the City's supplies and equipment is purchased centrally by the Department of General
Services' Division of Municipal Supplies, although individual agencies may make
purchases under $5,000. In contrast, the purchase of services (such as security guard
contracts, car services, repair services and the like) is decentralized, with each of the
City's agencies responsible regardless of the dollar amount of the contract. Contracts of
$10,000 awarded by means other than sealed bids (such as sole source contracts and those
based on requests for proposals), have required approval of the Board of Estimate before
the award could be finalized.
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Are municipal contracts let to a narrow group of firms?56 In New
York City the answer to both questions is "yes," a warning the City
must not ignore.
A few examples illustrate the magnitude of the problem, which is
not limited to any one agency or any one type of commodity or
service:
When the Department of Correction wanted to replace the com-
pany responsible for maintaining the elevators in City prisons, it
split the job into five separate components and put each one out to
bid separately. Only one company stepped forward to bid - the
same company the Department wanted to replace.
57
Between October, 1987 and June, 1988, the Departments of Sanita-
tion and Transportation awarded five security guard contracts
worth $6.8 million to a single firm, the only one that bid.
From March, 1988 through July, 1988, the Human Resources Ad-
ministration awarded one car service company nearly $9 million in
four separate contracts to drive children in Manhattan, Queens
and the Bronx to and from foster homes, hospitals and court ap-
pointments. It was the only company to submit a bid of the 535
invited to do so.
The reluctance among vendors to bid on City business is under-
standable. Those brave enough to do so face an awesome mountain of
paperwork. Even worse, the terms and conditions for City contracts
are not standardized - each agency sets its own, even if the service it
is purchasing is identical to that of other agencies. Vendors must pay
for lawyers to check the fine print of each and every contract, lest
there be some hidden term or condition that will come back to haunt
them. Small companies, unable to shoulder this additional expense,
simply stay away. A vendor testifying at the Commission's public
hearing summed up the problem: 8 "My biggest problem with the
City agencies is that every one of them requires a different piece of
paper. You would think that you were dealing with Gimbel's and
Macy's and Sterns." The City is also notoriously late to pay its bills,
scaring away some potential bidders for whom payment delay means
a struggle to meet their payroll.
The average shopper knows that when stores are competing for
56. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MAINTAINING MUNICIPAL
INTEGRITY: TRAINERS HANDBOOK Appendix F, at 275 (April 1980).
57. Depending on the circumstances, experts consider five bids or three bids the bare
minimum necessary for adequate competition.
58. Two days of public hearings on contracting and procurement practices of New
York City government at which City employees and contracting experts testified were
held by our Commission on October 24 and 25, 1989.
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business, prices go down, and that the lack of competition drives them
up. This maxim holds true in the marketplace of government pro-
curement as well. New York City is clearly paying higher prices than
it should as a result of the dwindling number of vendors competing
for City business.
The lack of competition has been partly caused by the inexperience
and poor training of some City contracting staff who lack the skill to
attract new vendors. It is not uncommon for bid materials to be sent
to vendors too late for them to submit a bid or to vendors who are not
even in the business of providing the service being sought. The Com-
mission found, for instance, that bid documents.for elevator mainte-
nance contracts were mailed to an artesian well company; "Island-
Wide Photo" was sent bid documents for a contract to repair window
sashes; invitaticns to bid on a contract to install canvas awnings were
mailed to one ironworks company, three asphalt paving companies,
one hydrographic survey company, one water main and sewer com-
pany and six construction companies, among others. At present,
there is no requirement that the hundreds of employees who spend
billions of taxpayer dollars on services, supplies, equipment or con-
struction be professionally certified as proficient in buying skills, a re-
quirement commonplace in other jurisdictions.59
The problems of the City's contracting system have been aggra-
vated by the City's reaction to the municipal corruption scandals
which began to unfold in late 1985 and early 1986. An ordinary con-
sultant contract is now subject to ten separate layers of review and
approval, not counting the layers of internal review within the agency
awarding the contract. Although each added layer of oversight
originated from a good intention, their cumulative effect is to slow the
City's business to a crawl, impairing vital programs and deterring
vendors from bidding on City business.
Fortunately, the new City Charter adopted by the voters on No-
vember 7, 1989 sets the City on a new course. A new five-member
Procurement Policy Board is charged with developing uniform, City-
wide rules for soliciting bids, selecting vendors and managing con-
tracts. It also has the power to impose deadlines aimed at cutting
back on the delay that plagues the City's contracting system and to
simplify and standardize the contract language which now confuses
and discourages vendors.
Sweeping though the Charter changes are, they are not self-execut-
59. Government procurement is a profession complete with professional examina-
tions and certification procedures, a professional oath and code of professional ethics. As
of 1989, only eleven City employees had attained professional certification.
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ing and the Charter alone cannot restore integrity to the City's con-
tracting operations. First, the City needs a Deputy Mayor who would
oversee, for a two-year period, reform of the City's contracting opera-
tions. Currently, responsibility is so diffuse that coordinated reform is
impossible.
Second, the reforms to be proposed by the Procurement Policy
Board will never materialize if the expertise is lacking at the agency
level - where the actual purchases are made - to implement those
reforms. Each City agency must appoint at a senior management
level a Chief Contracting Officer with a professional procurement
background. This person would have responsibility for all aspects of
the agency's contracting functions, making sure that the City gets the
most for its contract dollars.
Third, the hundreds of employees who spend billions of taxpayer
dollars each year must be given professional training in government
procurement practices. Too much money is at stake to entrust this
responsibility to purchasing staff who lack the skills necessary to get
the best possible deal for the City.
Fourth, after clear rules are in place and accountability is clearly
established, the City must stop trying to police each contract - with
layer upon layer of review - before it is awarded. Instead, it must
move to a system for spot-checking contract decisions after the fact,
to make sure that contracts are awarded in accordance with the City's
rules and procedures.
One of the expert witnesses at the Commission's hearing testified
that the appointment of a Chief Contracting Officer in each agency -
coupled, among other things, with upgrading the experience and
training of City contracting staff and improving the City's data collec-
tion - would save the City at least $60 million in the first year alone.
The City, now face-to-face with declining tax revenues and a serious
budget deficit, cannot afford to ignore these savings.
New York City's contracting operations suffer from both too little
and too much control: too many layers of review, too few clear rules
and streamlined procedures. It is widely recognized that "good man-
agement is the foremost antidote to corruption in government." Yet
New York does not so much as manage its contracting operations as
police them - through a system of checks, controls and barriers -
that strangles competition and efficiency.
Good management of the City's contracting does not require the
City to launch into uncharted territory. The road to reform is clearly
mapped out.
There is no longer time for half-measures. The new City Charter
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creates an unprecedented opportunity to reform the City's outmoded
and inefficient contracting system and, at the same time, to safeguard
that system from corruption. The citizens of New York City deserve
nothing less.
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ETHICS TRAINING FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The whole art of government consists in the art of being honest.
Thomas Jefferson
It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity,
reason and justice tell me I ought to do.
Edmund Burke (1775)
Public employees face a thicket of laws, regulations and disclosure
requirements designed to prevent conflicts of interest and to insure
that the public interest is not subordinated for private gain. Many
agencies in New York State fail to translate these complex rules and
regulations into clear and simple guidelines understandable to non-
lawyers, leaving public employees on their own to figure out how the
law applies to their own situations. Far too many agencies simply
hand new employees a daunting package of laws, regulations and for-
mal legal opinions.'
In New York City, new employees are warned in ominous language
that they are "subject to" the City Code of Ethics. Their ethical re-
sponsibilities sound more like a debilitating disease to which public
employees are prone than to the embodiment of an honorable tradi-
tion of service which goes back thousands of years. Typically, new
City employees are handed an orientation packet containing copies of
the Code of Ethics and a welter of mayoral executive orders, Board of
Ethics opinions and excerpts from the State's penal code. Some City
agencies supplement this blizzard of legalese with clear and simple
explanations to assist the average employee to comply with the re-
quirements of the law.
At the State level, the situation is only slightly different. In many
agencies, new employees receive no more than a printed copy of the
State Public Officers Law and are asked to swear that they will abide
by its provisions. The Public Officers Law, like most statutes, is not
self-explanatory.
The responsibility of translating key ethics laws into plain English
that the average employee can understand should not be left to indi-
vidual state or local government agencies. It must be shouldered cen-
60. The Commission surveyed over one hundred government agencies in New York
City and New York State, collecting the materials, when there were any, that they used
to educate their employees about their ethical obligations as public servants.
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trally: in New York City, the job belongs to the Conflicts of Interest
Board. At the State level, it belongs to the State Ethics
Commission.
Although clear guidelines spelling out a public employee's obliga-
tions under existing ethics-in-government laws are essential, they
alone are not sufficient to inspire public servants to dedicate them-
selves to the public good. The law's overwhelming objective is to pro-
hibit certain actions and punish transgressors. Ethics laws should
represent a minimum standard; obeying the law should not be all we
expect from our public servants. Unfortunately, however, it some-
times ends up that way. "I did nothing illegal" echoes as justification
for a wide spectrum of violations of the public trust. What should be
a starting point for ethical conduct becomes a resting place. "Persons
are not 'ethical' simply because they act lawfully. One can be dishon-
est, unprincipled, untrustworthy, unfair and uncaring without break-
ing the law." 62
A small minority of City and State agencies have recognized the
need to go beyond the law's prohibitions and punishments. They
have developed and communicated a positive, inspirational statement
of their agency's mission that conveys to employees how their individ-
ual efforts contribute to the agency's success or failure. But more
must strive to do this. Once an agency has clearly articulated its sense
of purpose, its "mission statement" should become the springboard
for developing an employee code of ethical conduct which not only
prohibits behavior detrimental to the achievement of the agency's
goals but which affirmatively encourages ethical conduct.
Public employees may be subject to enormous pressures in the
course of a typical work day to cut ethical corners or to turn a blind
eye to padded bills, requests for political favors and wrongdoing by
co-workers or bosses. With a few striking exceptions, State and City
agencies fail to provide adequate training to help public employees
recognize the many ethical dilemmas they face and to withstand the
often formidable pressure to depart from the standards of honesty and
impartiality the public rightfully expects.63
61. There is hope that this responsibility will be met. The New York State Ethics
Commission is in the process of drafting a practical guide to the State Ethics in Govern-
ment Act which it hopes to disseminate before the end of 1990. The City Conflicts of
Interest Board is further behind, although it appears to recognize the need to develop
such materials.
62. M. Josephson, Limitations of Ethics Laws, reprinted in, ETHNET (Spring 1989).
63. A handful of agencies with law enforcement responsibility, such as the New York
City Police Department, the New York City Buildings Department and the State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance use extensive training materials to help recruits and new
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Ethics training for public employees is a crucial management re-
sponsibility, as important as budgeting or strategic planning. Agency
heads must devote time, energy and thought to identifying the kinds
of ethical dilemmas which employees are likely to encounter in their
day-to-day work. By exposing their employees, in workshops and
seminars, to case studies in ethical issues derived from the agencies'
own experience, agency heads must strive to encourage employees to
feel that public service is a source of honor and pride."4 All too often,
in the rush to ferret out government corruption, the preventive value
of comprehensive ethics training - from plain English explanations
of the law to courses and seminars - has been overlooked and ig-
nored. The explosion of resources devoted to investigative agencies
and to the hiring of investigators, auditors and the like contrasts
sharply with the relative lack of attention and resources allocated to
ethics training. If "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,"
surely the time has come for a more widespread and imaginative use
of ethics training.
inspectors recognize, understand and withstand the ethical problems they will encounter
on the job.
64. At the State level, the Governor's Office of Employee Relations (OER) has put
together training materials to help management employees cope, among other things,
with situations where they have been directed to take action which conflicts with their
personal and professional values. Unfortunately, these materials are not yet widely used
and only a handful of relatively senior managers who sign up for one of OER's courses
benefit from them. In addition, lawyers in the State Attorney General's Office attend a
two-day annual training conference that offers an optional ethics workshop. In 1987, the
State Division of Criminal Justice Services held a full-day conference on ethics that was
attended by over 800 public employees from the law enforcement field. These are all
important efforts that need to be expanded.
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WHISTLEBLOWERS
The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to
do nothing.
Even if the best efforts are made to minimize opportunities for cor-
ruption - if all the Commission's recommendations were adopted
tomorrow - governments in New York State would still fall victim
to some degree of corruption, waste, mismanagement, fraud or illegal-
ity. For this reason, government must do all it can to encourage and
protect public employees who come forward to "blow the whistle" on
these bad practices.
Public employees are the single most important source of informa-
tion about misconduct in government and perform a valuable public
service when they speak out. Yet they face powerful pressures to re-
main silent. We live in a society that puts a premium on "minding
your own business" and uses pejorative labels such as "rat" and
"snitch" to refer to those who tell on their peers. With good reason,
many public employees think that those who blow the whistle are
likely to be fired, demoted, denied advancement, harassed or other-
wise suffer retaliation.
Time and again, public employees who, in the privacy of their of-
fices, spoke candidly to Commission staff about problems in their
agency were unwilling to repeat the same testimony publicly. Others
simply refused to talk with us at all. If public employees are reluctant
to be truthful and candid with investigators who ask them for help,
how likely is it they will come forward on their own initiative to re-
veal corruption?
In 1987, the Legislature recognized the importance of protecting
public employees who disclose wrongdoing and adopted a law that
specifically prohibits state agencies from retaliating against
whistleblowers.65 But the law's provisions fall short in four major
ways. In fact some of its provisions can backfire - harming the very
people it was intended to protect.
First, the best shield for a whistleblower is anonymity. If the per-
son's identity is unknown to the agency, they cannot be harassed, de-
moted or fired. Unfortunately, the law itself makes anonymity
impossible and poses an intolerable dilemma for the employee who
wants to speak out about wrongdoing: the only way that employee
can claim protection under the whistleblower law is if he or she has
first brought the information to the attention of superiors.
65. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney 1984).
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The problems with this approach are obvious. If the superiors are
involved in wrongdoing themselves, this notification requirement
means whistleblowers are "damned if they do and damned if they
don't." And it not only gives the agency an opportunity to punish the
messenger but also to cover up the misconduct.
The other bad side effect of the notification requirement is that if an
employee is unaware of this provision and brings wrongdoing to the
attention of an outside authority, such as a prosecutor, he or she can-
not claim protection. There is a good chance that many public em-
ployees will not know about this requirement because public agencies
are not required to make them aware of the law or how it works.
Clearly it is unfair to protect only those who are sophisticated about
how to protect themselves.
The law is too narrow in a second area: a public employee who
provides information at the request of an investigative body such as
our Commission, to a grand jury or even at a trial, has no protection
from retribution. It is ironic that on the one hand a person has a legal
obligation to testify truthfully, but on the other hand can be fired for
doing so. This is not just a theoretical problem. There were occasions
when public employees interviewed by the Commision were reluctant
to cooperate because they were afraid of reprisals. Other states have
recognized the need to protect this kind of cooperating witness; it is
time New York did the same.
Third, public employees are only given protection if they disclose
governmental misconduct which they believe to be a violation of law.
Yet clearly public officials must be held to a higher standard than not
being lawbreakers. The whistleblower law should therefore also pro-
tect public employees who reveal corruption, gross mismanagement,
conflicts of interest, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority or a sub-
stantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
Fourth, while retaliation against whistleblowers is against the law,
it will inevitably occur from time to time. When it does,
whistleblowers are given no governmental assistance to redress the
harm they suffer. If an employee is demoted or fired, he or she must
bear the emotional and financial burden of going to court for vindica-
tion. Even though they have performed a courageous public service,
they must stand alone to fight for their rights. By contrast, the federal
whistleblower provision provides for the Office of Special Counsel to
investigate and prosecute retaliatory actions.
When a New York State employee speaks out about governmental
wrongdoing the whistleblower law offers little comfort and about as
much protection as an umbrella with holes. Until this law is im-
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proved, the brave voices of whistleblowers will be silenced, either by
fear or acts of revenge.
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THE UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.
Justice Brandeis
Other People's Money 62
In New York State there is a burgeoning shadow government -
powerful, wealthy and largely immune from scrutiny, let alone ac-
countabilty. This shadow government is not one monolithic entity,
rather it is comprised of myriad state authorities, local authorities,
not-for-profit corporations attached to state agencies and corporations
run by local governments.66
Together these entities will spend over $14.5 billion in fiscal year
1990 for public purposes. And although they are created by govern-
ment and controlled by government officials, they are exempt from
many of the controls designed to check favoritism, undue influence
and abuse of official position, as well as corruption, fraud, waste and
misuse of government funds.
This Commission is troubled by the phenomenon increasingly re-
vealed by its work. The rigid constraints imposed on traditional gov-
ernmental units do indeed hamper their effective functioning. The
reasons for seeking new forms of governmental organization are com-
pelling. But with the advent of authorities what has evolved in effect
are two governmental systems, one far more accountable to the public
than the other. The Commission questions the need for two distinct
systems. Perhaps the goals of government could be equally well real-
ized by modifying some of the provisions which hinder the effective-
ness and flexibility of traditional governmental bodies, and imposing
the same ethical standards and oversight on all governmental bodies,
including authorities and not-for-profit corporations.
Certain basic priniciples should apply to all those doing the busi-
ness of government, including authorities and other public corpora-
tions. These principles include at a minimum: public disclosure of
transactions; contracting procedures that ensure competition; employ-
ment decisions based on merit and fitness; decisionmaking by leaders
free from conflicts of interest; documentation of all decisions; sound
66. See NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, THE UN-
DERGROUND GOVERNMENT: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON AUTHORITIES AND OTHER
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS (April 1990).
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internal controls; and periodic audit of books and records, with the
results made public.
We strongly urge the Governor to create another Moreland Act
Commission to examine this area in depth and make recommenda-
tions for further specific reforms.
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WESTCHESTER COUNTY
The first requisite in the citizen who wishes to share the work of
our public life ... is that he shall act disinterestedly and with a
sincere purpose to serve the whole commonwealth.
Theodore Roosevelt
If public faith in the trusteeship value of public office is the key-
stone of democracy's arch, self-serving behavior is the cardinal vice
of public officials.
Joel Fleischman
The "stewardship of public officers is a serious and sacred trust" '67
and in an ideal world, a strong conscience would be enough to guide a
public official in safeguarding that trust. But we do not live in an
ideal world. In fact, the political system itself creates the need for
other controls. Many officials in New York emerge from strong polit-
ical parties and owe their place on the ballot to political party leaders;
yet once they take office we expect them to shift their allegiance to
those they govern. And it is the elected official who must govern, not
the unelected, unaccountable party leader.
Political party leaders have vastly different concerns than public
officals: advancing the party organization, rewarding the party faith-
ful and filling the coffers of the party's campaign committee. Because
these are private activities and not governmental, party leaders are
not held to the same ethical standards as public officials. Nor are they
subject to the control that citizens exercise in the voting booth. For
this reason, there is a real danger to government integrity when polit-
ical party leaders insinuate themselves into the actual operations of
government - a place they do not belong.
The Commission found that in Westchester County what should
have been a bright line between the dominant political party and the
operations of the county government, was instead a blur. In fact,
Anthony Colavita, the leader of the Westchester County Republican
Party had such extraordinary influence over the affairs of government
that he became a de facto official of the government. He controlled
county jobs, was involved in the budget negotiations of county offices
and was able to fill the coffers of the party committee with contribu-
tions from those doing business with the county.
67. Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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Nowhere was the party leader's power more visible than at the
Playland Amusement Park. The Park is county owned, and at least
in theory, operated by the County Department of Parks. A startling
example of Colavita's power occurred in 1983 when Richard Keeler, a
loyal and active member of the Westchester County Republican
Party, was faced with the loss of his job. Colavita helped Keeler - a
man with virtually no amusement park or recreation experience - to
obtain a job at Playland. Several months later Keeler was named gen-
eral manager, replacing a 25-year veteran of the amusement park
business who was forced into retirement. As general manager, Keeler
had complete discretion over hiring full-time and seasonal employees
and control over the private companies that wanted Playland con-
tracts to run rides, games and food stands.
The extent of Keeler's control and political connections was quite
plain to Playland vendors. Many thought his political connections
were his best "qualifications" for the job. During Keeler's tenure as
the Park's manager, nearly all Playland vendors contributed to the
Westchester County Republican Committee with which he was so
visibly connected. The vendors gave to "make Mr. Keeler happy," as
"insurance" of continued business opportunities at Playland, and be-
cause they believed that the County Republican party "was responsi-
ble for [their] lease[s]." Some vendors even dropped off their
contributions at Keeler's Playland office.
One company which wanted to do business at Playland even went
to the office of the Westchester County Republican Party to initiate a
contract. Party officials did nothing to indicate to the company that it
was county officials and not party officials who were the proper per-
sons to approach on these matters. Later, Keeler agreed to a lopsided
deal with the company that was so skewed it caused the county to lose
over $900,000. The contract was renewed for five years, even though
the county was aware of the previous losses. For its part, the com-
pany became the biggest contributor to the party committee of all the
Playland vendors. Although the company's president claims the com-
pany's political contributions were not linked to his business dealings
with the county, the perception of influence-seeking is inescapable.
The motivation, risk and appearance of a quid pro quo will always
exist when those doing business with a government make political
contributions - whether the money is given to a candidate or a party
committee. These types of contributions jeopardize the faith of citi-
zens that government is serving the public good and not selfish private
interests - they must be banned.
Keeler's control over jobs at Playland served the party well when
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Republican Guy Parisi ran for County Clerk in 1985. Parisi hired
David Warager as his campaign coordinator in May of 1985 but
lacked campaign funds to pay him a full-time salary. In order to tide
him over until the campaign was in full swing, Keeler gave Warager a
secret high paying, part-time job at Playland. Warager's own words
best describe this package deal: "[i]f you're asking me is this cronyism
in the old-fashioned sense, that this job paid me so that the Republi-
can party could pay me less for doing their work, I'm not going to
deny that."
As head of the Westchester County Republican Party, Colavita
controlled the party's nominations for office and parlayed this control
into a successful patronage operation that extended beyond the
amusement park. In one case, he agreed to give the County Clerk,
George Morrow, the party's nomination for re-election in exchange
for control over appointment of the Clerk's deputies and a commit-
ment from Morrow to seek increased contributions from the deputies
to the party.
Although Morrow was not re-elected in 1982, the party lost none of
its power over jobs in the Clerk's Office. The new, Democratic
County Clerk, Andrew Spano, went to Colavita for assistance when
the County Board of Legislators cut staff positions from his budget.
Colavita prevailed upon the legislators, most of whom were Republi-
cans, to restore a number of positions. In exchange, Spano hired only
Republican-referred candidates for half of the restored slots.
The party leader's control over jobs was a blatant and classic form
of patronage: jobs which belonged to the public became the currency
with which he rewarded supporters, favored friends and increased his
own power. The effects of this patronage were also classic - im-
paired employee morale and decreased government effectiveness. The
quest for more ethical government demands the abolition of pa-
tronage, wherever it exists in New York State.
Westchester County provides an example of how a political party
leader's influence over the workings of government can equal or ex-
ceed that of public officials. If a public official uses his power for
corrupt purposes, such as promising someone a job in exchange for
campaign assistance or a vote, he faces felony prosecution. When a
party leader's power extends to governmental affairs such as public
employment then he should also be subject to the same prohibitions
against corrupt use of power and face the same penalties for
transgressions.
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THE POUGHKEEPSIE 1985 TOWN BOARD ELECTION
You shouldn't be able to do what we did in Poughkeepsie.
Robert Congel, Pyramid
In the fall of 1985 the voters of Poughkeepsie, New York, a Hud-
son River town with a population of approximately 40,000, exper-
ienced a Town Board election campaign that was the first of its kind
- slick, sophisticated, and high-priced. When the voters went to the
polls they did not know that the price - over three quarters of a
million dollars - effectively had been paid by a giant real estate con-
glomerate with an economic stake in the outcome of the election. The
story of that 1985 election reveals how New York's weak election law
can be manipulated to serve wealthy business interests and in the pro-
cess undermine the integrity of the townspeople's votes. Until there is
sweeping reform, the integrity of local elections everywhere in New
York State is at risk.
The company that so effectively influenced that election is called
Pyramid. Pyramid took these actions in order to build a controversial
shopping mall -"The Galleria" - on 109 acres located in Pough-
keepsie. The land was zoned for residential use and without a zoning
change Pyramid could not build. Pyramid first sought the change
from the Dutchess County Planning Department, Which turned them
down, on October 4, 1985, after concluding' that the proposed mall
was incompatible with the county and town master plans and would
worsen existing traffic problems.
Because of the rejection, Pyramid's hopes then lay with the seven-
member Town Board, which could override the county's veto by a
"supermajority" of five of the seven votes. All board members were
up for re-election and controversy over the mall had been raging all
summer. Based on public positions taken by both incumbent board
members and challengers, Pyramid knew that they were assured of
only three favorable votes. The results of opinion polls and focus
group discussions, financed by Pyramid, further revealed that four
other pro-mall candidates, who were Republicans, were likely to lose
in the upcoming elections and would need a big boost. If Pyramid
could influence the outcome of those races, with an infusion of large
sums of money, they could build their mall.
In order to do so it was necessary to skirt the $1,000 limit on con-
tributions to Town Board candidates. It was also essential to the
scheme that Pyramid's financial backing be kept secret for fear that a
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backlash against their influence could damage the pro-mall candi-
dates. Pyramid developed a campaign strategy in consultation with an
Albany-based attorney, Thomas Spargo - then counsel to the Re-
publican State Committee and State Senate Elections Committee -
that achieved both goals.
Instead of making direct contributions to the campaigns of the pro-
mall candidates, a devious indirect route was taken: contributions
were made to two political party committees and one political action
committee whose purse strings were controlled by Spargo, with the
understanding that the money would be used to help the four Repub-
lican pro-mall candidates. Under current New York Law the only
limit on contributions to such committees is $150,000 per year! Pur-
suant to this secret and deceptive strategy nineteen Pyramid partners
and their relatives contributed $301,000 to the New York Republican
State Committee, the New York Republican Federal Campaign Com-
mittee, and Building a Better New York, a political action committee
(PAC) formed by Spargo three weeks before the election. These com-
mittees in turn spent $267,245 in the four pivotal races. By funnelling
campaign contributions through the committees, Pyramid was able to
outspend the Democrats by 15 to 1 and still remain invisible to the
voters. Most of the money was contributed and reported post-election
and none of the contributions were ever disclosed to the Dutchess
County Board of Elections.
Spargo's scheme for paying the more than 40 vendors involved in
the campaign further guaranteed Pyramid's invisibility: Philip Fried-
man, a New York City based political consultant hired by Pyramid,
acted as Pyramid's general contractor. Vendors would send invoices
to Friedman, who would forward them to Pyramid. Pyramid, after
consultation with Spargo, would then forward the bills to one of the
three committees that had received Pyramid contributions. The dis-
closure forms filed by Spargo on behalf of the committees did not
reveal which expenditures were made in Poughkeepsie.
Friedman also helped devise a campaign strategy for Pyramid that
played up two themes that would appeal to residents who might vote
for the Republican pro-mall candidates: opposition to high taxes and
emphasis on careful town planning. Friedman knew what themes to
stress from the results of the same opinion polls and focus groups that
revealed which pro-mall candidates needed help.
There were two major elements to the campaign strategy. One was
a media blitz. During a three-week period prior to the election, Pyra-
mid had more than 80 different pieces of literature, all fine-tuned to
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reflect the themes of planning and taxes, distributed to voters in the
pivotal wards. As Friedman stated:
Direct mail .... [a]llowed us to create artificial issues. In letters
and brochures we articulated for the voter the concerns he might
not have bcen able to articulate .... The voter was unaware that
he told us, through focus group discussions and responses to poll
questions, what issues to present in our mailing.
The second element was door-to-door campaigning, which en-
hanced the candidates' name-recognition and helped them make their
pitch in a direct and personal way. Two Pyramid-paid consultants
coached candidates on how to present themselves, instructed them on
the issues to emphasize - planning and taxes - and even accompa-
nied them on dnor-to-door visits. The consultants kept Pyramid regu-
larly informed of the campaigns' progress.
Pyramid's influence was even concealed from the very candidates
who received its help. At Pyramid's direction, both the source of the
campaign funding and the contents of the campaign literature were
never discussed with the candidates. In fact, some campaign literature
sent by Pyramid's consultants contained the forged signatures of the
candidates.
In addition to the $301,000 in campaign contributions from Pyra-
mid-connected individuals, the company itself spent at least $475,967
for campaign and image building services in Poughkeepsie. The in-
vestments paid off. Three of the four Pyramid-backed candidates
were elected; the new Town Board approved the zone change; and
Pyramid built its mall.
Shortly after the election, the Town Supervisor complained to the
State Board of Elections about numerous election law violations dur-
ing the campaign by Spargo, the Republican State Committee, Build-
ing a Better New York and others. The Board of Elections'
investigation of those complaints was shocking for its failures. The
Board not only failed to uncover a large percentage of the $301,000
contributed to the three committees or a single penny of the com-
pany's $475,967 in independent expenditures, but it also never investi-
gated or discovered the true purpose animating Pyramid's
contributions to the committees: its desire to promote secretly the
campaigns of pro-mall candidates without the restriction of campaign
contribution limits.
Although there is a need for sweeping reform of the election law,
this case study points out five reforms in particular that will help pre-
vent "another Poughkeepsie:"
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First, the limit on what an individual can give to a political com-
mittee - currently $150,000 - must be reduced to no more than
$4,000 to a party committee and no more than $2,000 to a PAC. Fur-
ther, there must be a reasonable limit on what committees can spend
on a particular candidate - currently there is no limit.
Second, such limits alone cannot prevent the indirect infusion of
vast sums into local races. Had limits existed in 1985, Pyramid could
have created a multitude of PACs to serve as funnels to the candi-
dates. The law must be changed to control this "earmarking" - con-
tributing to a committee with an understanding that the contribution
will be used for a particular candidate. An earmarked contribution to
a political committee should be considered a contribution to the can-
didate for whom it is intended and subject to the same limit as a direct
individual contribution to that candidate. The political committee
that receives the earmarked contribution should be responsible for re-
porting both the identity of the contributor and the identity of the
candidate for whom the money is intended.
Third, even with these changes, unless Poughkeepsie voters were
familiar with the names of Pyramid partners they could not have
known that the $301,000 in contributions came from people con-
nected to the company. Lax disclosure rules in New York State do
not require political committees to report the name and address of the
contributor's employer or business affiliation. This is a serious weak-
ness that prevents the public from learning if a particular business
interest has paid the fare to bring leaders to office.
Fourth, apart from the contributions by Pyramid-related individu-
als, the company itself paid almost a half-million dollars to firms for
work in Poughkeepsie, an indeterminate percentage of which was
campaign related. These so-called "independent" expenditures were
not disclosed anywhere. The Federal government requires disclosure
of this type of campaign support and there is clearly an urgent need
for a similar requirement in New York State.
Fifth, the voters in Poughkeepsie never knew that the avalanche of
slick campaign literature was unauthorized by the candidates and
paid for with Pyramid money because the law does not require that
such sponsorship be revealed. This omission threatens the integrity of
the electoral process.
During the 1985 Poughkeepsie Town Board election campaign, a
mockery was made of New York's election law. Unless the law is
strengthened and the Board of Elections made more independent, the
devious scheme that subverted the integrity of the 1985 election in
Poughkeepsie can be perpetrated again, anywhere in New York State.
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Under the State's current law one is left to wonder how many other
times similar schemes have been perpetrated in New York without
any public knowledge.
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CONCLUSION
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If an-
gels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed,
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on
the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government;
but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.
The Federalist, No. 51
When you realize [Athens'] greatness, then reflect that what
made her great was men with a spirit of adventure, men who knew
their duty, men who were ashamed to fall below a certain standard.
Pericles
When the recent corruption scandals broke in the New York City
government and in the State Legislature, officials across the political
spectrum declared that they were fully committed to sweeping
change, ready to do whatever was necessary to reform the govern-
ment. And in the last three years, there have been some moves in the
right direction. New York City has a new public campaign finance
law and a tougher ethics law. The City has also disbanded the Talent
Bank as it existed and is moving to reform its contracting procedures.
The State has a new ethics law, and the housekeeping accounts of the
major political parties are finally open to public scrutiny. But, as
noted elsewhere in this report, these reforms do not go nearly far
enough.
The stakes are high for all New Yorkers. It is clear what needs to
be done. The Commission's recommendations, and the similar outcry
of civic groups, bar associations, concerned citizens, and editorial
boards throughout New York must be heeded. When, according to a
poll conducted for the Commission in 1988, only 27% of the voters in
our State believe that "most people who run for public office are hon-
est," our democracy is in trouble. We cannot afford more of the
same.
The recommendations of the Commission follow thorough investi-
gation. If adopted they will change the political climate in our State
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from one of mistrust and cynicism, to one much closer to the ideal of
openness and honesty.
But right now, these are only recommendations. That is all a
Moreland Act commission can provide. The Commission is neither a
lobby, nor representative of a special interest, nor a citizen's advocacy
group. Now it is up to our representatives to take action. It is time
for our officials to rise above partisanship and self-interest, and enact
the tough reforms we must have, reforms that may require that they
give up personal advantage for the common good. So be it; that is
what it means when we say, "public service is a public trust." And as
citizens, we must stay informed about these issues and work actively
for change, and we must be willing to pay for such reforms as public
campaign financing and adequate enforcement of the new laws. None
of us can escape the stark choice we face: recurring scandal and ever-
deepening apathy if we continue to ignore these problems, or a new
era of inspiration and change if we are willing to meet the tasks at
hand with determination and conviction.
In September, 1987, several months after the Commission on Gov-
ernment Integrity was appointed, Governor Cuomo said this to us: "I
believe that a continued commitment to improvement by our Legisla-
ture, a persistent, undeviating emphasis on reform by the executive
together with your help can make this the beginning of the most excit-
ing reform era in this State's history."
The Commission has fulfilled its commitment. The legislature and
executive must now fulfill theirs.
We know from experience that often, when it comes to ethics re-
form, nothing gets done unless there is a scandal.. Some public offi-
cials have told our Commission that without scandal, ethics reform is
not possible in New York State. But we know that it does not have to
be that way. Nor should it be. This State has neglected ethics reform
for a long time; the people of this State are entitled to laws which
promote honest government without waiting for more scandals. It is
clear what needs to be done.
The battle against lethargy and self-dealing has never been easy.
But we must go forward nonetheless.
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Appendix A: Executive Order
Executive Order 88.1, creating the Commission on Government
Integrity.
STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 88.1:
APPOINTING SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS TO INVESTIGATE
INSTANCES OF CORRUPTION IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF GOVERNMENT AND TO DETERMINE THE ADEQUACY
OF LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES RELATING
TO GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY
WHEREAS, in March 1986, I, acting jointly with the Mayor of the
City of New York, appointed the State-City Commission on Integrity
in Government to make recommendations for improving laws, regula-
tions and procedures relating to the prevention of corruption, favorit-
ism, undue influence and abuse of official position in government;
WHEREAS, such Commission has issued reports identifying seri-
ous flaws in certain existing laws, regulations and procedures within
the subject matter of its inquiry;
WHEREAS, such Commission has issued a final report in which it
recommends the appointment of a new Commission with investigative
powers, including the authority to compel the attendance and testi-
mony of witnesses and the production of records;
WHEREAS, since the appointment of such Commission last
March, events bearing on public confidence in the integrity of govern-
ment have continued to unfold;
WHEREAS, certain completed and ongoing criminal prosecutions
raise issues relating to integrity in government which are more appro-
priately explored in a parallel investigation than in the course of such
prosecutions; and
WHEREAS, it is my judgment that it is of compelling public im-
portance that weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures
relating to government integrity be further investigated and
addressed;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to section six and subdivision
eight of section sixty-three of the Executive Law, I, MARIO M.
CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York, do hereby:
I. Appoint a Commission to be known as the Commission on
Government Integrity with seven members, who shall be John D.
Feerick, Richard D. Emery, Patricia M. Hynes, James L. Magavern,
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Bernard S. Meyer, Bishop Emerson J. Moore and Cyrus R. Vance, as
special commissioners, to investigate the management and affairs of
any department, board, bureau, commission (including any public
benefit corporation) or political subdivision of the State in respect to
the adequacy of laws, regulations and procedures relating to main-
taining ethical practices and standards in government, assuring that
public servants are duly accountable for the faithful discharge of the
public trust reposed in them, and preventing favoritism, conflicts of
interest, undue influence and abuse of official position and to make
recommendations for action to strengthen and improve such laws,
regulations and procedures.
II. The Commission shall, subject to Paragraph I of this order:
1. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and
procedures intended to prevent the use of public or political
party position for personal enrichment and determine
whether such weaknesses create an undue potential for cor-
ruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official po-
sition or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity
of government.
2. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and
procedures intended to prohibit conflicts of interest or bring
about the disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and de-
termine whether such weaknesses create an undue potential
for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of offi-
cial position or otherwise impair public confidence in the
integrity of government.
3. Investigate weaknesses in existing enforcement machinery
for laws, regulations and procedures relating to unethical
practices and determine whether such weaknesses create
undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence
or abuse of official position or otherwise impair public con-
fidence in the integrity of government.
4. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and
procedures regarding the sale or leasing of real property by
or to governments, public authorities or public benefit cor-
porations, the sponsorship of publicly assisted housing or
other development projects, the solicitation of government
business, permits, franchises, and the like and determine
whether such weaknesses create an undue potential for cor-
ruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of official po-
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sition or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity
of government.
5. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and
procedures relating to campaign contributions and cam-
paign expenditures and determine whether such weaknesses
create an undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue
influence or abuse of official position or otherwise impair
public confidence in the integrity of government.
6. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and
procedures regarding the representation of private parties
by public or political party officials before public agencies
and determine whether such weaknesses create an undue
potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or
abuse of official position or otherwise impair public confi-
dence in the integrity of government.
7. Investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and
procedures regarding the selection of judges and to deter-
mine whether such weaknesses create an undue potential
for corruption, favoritism, undue influence or abuse of offi-
cial position or otherwise impair public confidence in the
integrity of government.
III. John D. Feerick is hereby designated Chairman of the Com-
mission. I hereby give and grant to the Commissioners all the powers
and authorities that may be given or granted to persons appointed by
me under authority of section six of the Executive Law, provided,
however, that (1) the issuance of subpoenas shall require the prior
approval of the Chairman and at least three other Commissioners and
(2) the Commissioners may adopt such procedures as they believe
necessary governing the exercise of the powers and authorities given
or granted to the Commissioners pursuant to such section six.
IV. Pursuant to subdivision eight of section sixty-three of the Ex-
ecutive Law, and subject to Paragraph I of this Order, I hereby direct
the Attorney General to inquire into the matters set forth in Para-
graph I of this Order which I find involve public peace, public safety
and public justice, and request that the Attorney General do so by
appointing one or more of the above named Commissioners or their
counsels or deputies as Deputy Attorneys General and delegating to
such Deputy Attorneys General authority to exercise the investigative
powers that are provided for in an investigation pursuant to such sec-
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tion sixty-three upon a majority vote of the Commission and with the
approval of the Chairman.
V. The Chairman shall have the power to employ such counsel,
deputies, officers and other persons as the Commission may require to
accomplish the purposes of this order and to fix their compensation.
VI. The Commission in its inquiry shall comply with section sev-
enty-three of the Civil Rights Law and with such other regulations
and procedures as the Commission may adopt to protect the rights of
those affected by its inquiry and the integrity of its proceedings.
VII. If in the course of its inquiry the Commission obtains evi-
dence of the violation of existing law, such evidence shall promptly be
communicated to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. The
Commission shall cooperate with prosecutorial agencies to avoid jeop-
ardizing ongoing investigations and prosecutions.
VIII. Every department, board, bureau, commission (including
any public benefit corporation) or political subdivision of the State
shall provide to the Commission every assistance and cooperation, in-
cluding use of State facilities, which may be necessary or desirable for
the accomplishment of the duties or purposes of this Order.
IX. Executive Order Number 88, dated January 15, 1987, is su-
perseded by this Executive Order.
G I V E N under my hand and the Privy Seal of the State in the City
of New York this 21st day of April in
the year one thousand nine hundred eighty-seven.
BY THE GOVERNOR /s/
Mario M. Cuomo
/s/
Gerald C. Crotty
Secretary to the Governor
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